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A (KAFKAESQUE) SHORT STORY
Homes are sacred spaces. Although they are real property, like
office buildings or restaurants, in American culture and jurispru-
dence, homes are specially protected. Culturally, the American
dream often centers around the ability to buy a home and raise a
family. Songs and movies about going home abound, and many of
us remember our heights marked on walls or our initials carved in
wood nostalgically. Legally, home ownership is incentivized
through tax breaks and shielded from attack by creditors through
bankruptcy and homestead laws; homes are protected from
searches by privacy law and in many states, one can defend the
home with deadly force. Indeed, homes are our most valued piece
of property. We bury our dogs in the backyard, and raise children
under its roof. We fight and make up. We eat, we drink, we sleep,
and we love—in our homes. And so, we hope and expect that the
law will protect our homes. But, as this Article discusses, this is not
always true. The story below illustrates how things can go dreadfully
wrong.
A homeowner makes his payments, but due to bulky, antiquated,
and wholly ineffective automated servicing systems, the bank misap-
plies them to another account. Because of this error, a computer
program cranks out a default notice and sends foreclosure docu-
ments to a local attorney, who will carry out the foreclosure sale. All
of this happens within a month or two and without anyone in au-
thority involved. No one, except for the homeowner, gathers
enough information to learn that the foreclosure is illegal. After
receiving notice of foreclosure, the homeowner calls the bank, fore-
closure attorneys, and the press—but to no avail. The homeowner
even seeks out an attorney of his own, but he cannot afford to pay
much, and few attorneys take foreclosure cases. Thus, the home-
owner fails to find counsel, and the foreclosure occurs in less than
two months. The system is broken.
The homeowner’s house is sold on the courthouse steps for pen-
nies on the dollar. And the new buyer—another large bank—files a
court action, called an unlawful detainer, to evict the homeowner
and to take possession of the house. When the homeowner receives
a summons, he sees a clear path to telling a court what happened
for the first time. On his court date, the homeowner appears on
time, in a suit, and with documents. He fights for his home. The
homeowner provides proof that he made payments in the amount
required by the note, that he notified the bank and foreclosure at-
torney of the same, and he argues that the new buyer cannot
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possibly have “right to possession” because the foreclosure sale was
illegal.
And you, reader, know that the homeowner is right. The foreclo-
sure is void because it was illegal. Title did not pass, and the new
buyer has no right to possession.
But the homeowner loses anyway. The court tells the homeowner
that it is prohibited from considering evidence that would chal-
lenge title, and rules in favor of the new buyer, who produced no
evidence at all. The court orders the homeowner to evacuate his
home in twenty days and to pay rent for the months he occupied
the home. If the homeowner does not do this, the judge warns that
he will face wage garnishment and forced eviction by the sheriff.
INTRODUCTION
Does this scenario sound like a bad dream or a Kafka short story?
It may, but I assure you it is not. This story reflects a new reality in
which nonjudicial foreclosure, combined with draconian unlawful
detainer laws, concretizes the injuries associated with wrongful fore-
closure, degrades the perceived legitimacy of the courts, and
suppresses valid claims of wrongful foreclosure. Indeed, this very
scenario happens regularly in a variety of states.1 This story is a very
real tale of how homeowners are harmed by a foreclosure process
that has largely escaped scholarly review. Rooted in the belief that
sunshine is a powerful disinfectant, this Article aims to shed light
on states that hogtie homeowners and makes a normative argument
that such a process is inconsistent with the rest of home-centric ju-
risprudence, notions of legitimacy, the modern trend towards
centralization and consolidation of claims, and our basic under-
standing of tort claims as deterrents.
In nonjudicial foreclosure states, foreclosures occur without judi-
cial involvement. Typically, the noteholder, or a representative of
the noteholder, initiates foreclosure through a private trustee. The
private trustee gives notice to the homeowner, initiates the sale, and
1. See, e.g., Fannie Mae v. Truong, 361 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Mo. 2012). In this case a home-
owner was evicted in an unlawful detainer despite the fact that he asserted that the bank sent
him two letters on the same day that fundamentally contradicted one another and made the
foreclosure illegal. The first letter indicated Mr. Truong complied with the modification
schedule and could receive a permanent modification. The second, sent on the same day by
the same bank, stated he was in default and would be foreclosed. The foreclosure occurred
only about a month after the letters were sent, and only one day after Mr. Truong returned
from Vietnam to find the letters in the mail. When Truong attempted to raise these facts in
the unlawful detainer, he was precluded from doing so.
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deeds the property to the new buyer.2 Advocates of nonjudicial
foreclosure tout its expediency, while those who criticize nonjudi-
cial foreclosure lament that it does not protect a homeowner before
he is legally divested of his home.3
Both are right. Nonjudicial foreclosure is fast—at least twice as
fast as judicial foreclosure.4 But, because the noteholder controls
the nonjudicial foreclosure process, nonjudicial foreclosure does a
poor job of detecting negligent or fraudulent foreclosures. In the
modern mortgage era, when it is increasingly common to question
who owes what to whom, and when government reports5 suggest
that hundreds of thousands of foreclosures involve errors, nonjudi-
cial foreclosure is too porous a filter to separate wrongful
foreclosures from justified ones. As a result, there are those who
suggest that nonjudicial foreclosure is never a good fit in the mod-
ern mortgage era, and that it should be replaced by full judicial
process. Those advocates suggest that no amount of examination
after a foreclosure can solve the fundamental problems present in
nonjudicial foreclosure.
This is an important debate, but it is not the focus of this Article,
which takes a largely pragmatic approach. Nonjudical foreclosure
will not be abolished anytime soon; it is deeply imbedded—espe-
cially in the West. As a result, I assume the ongoing existence of
nonjudicial foreclosure, and focus only on a subset of nonjudicial
foreclosure states that, rather than mitigate the risks of nonjudicial
foreclosure, enhance them—or even cause them. This specific
problem and my suggested solutions are the focus of the remainder
of this Article.
After a nonjudicial foreclosure, a court often becomes involved
in the physical eviction of the homeowner.6 Typically, the buyer of
2. Dale A. Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of the Deed
of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement to Enforce the Note, 66 ARK. L. REV. 21, 35, 1403 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Kasey Curtis, The Burst Bubble: Revisiting Foreclosure Law in Light of the Collapse
of the Housing Industry, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 124 (2008).
4. See KAREN M. PENCE, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, FORECLOSING ON OP-
PORTUNITY: STATE LAWS AND MORTGAGE CREDIT 5 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2003/200316/200316pap.pdf (judicial foreclosure process ranges from 148 to
300 days longer than nonjudicial foreclosures); John Campbell, Can We Trust Trustees? Propos-
als for Reducing Wrongful Foreclosures, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 103, 126 (2013) (nonjudicial
disclosure process ranges from twenty to 120 days, depending on state).
5. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, INDEPENDENT FORECLOSURE REVIEW (2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/independent-foreclosure-
review-2014.pdf.
6. Throughout this Article, I refer to the “homeowner” when referring to the party who
experiences a foreclosure and faces eviction. More precisely, after a foreclosure sale, this
party is the “past homeowner.” However, as described herein, because the legal status of that
party is not legally decided in many states before eviction, and because it is entirely possible
SPRING 2016] Unlawful Detainer Law 561
the home at the foreclosure sale brings an unlawful detainer to the
appropriate court. The buyer asserts that it acquired title at the
foreclosure sale; that the homeowner remains illegally; that the
court should evict the homeowner; and, that the court should
award damages for the delay.7 The buyer’s most fundamental asser-
tion is that it has title and right to possession. But what if the
homeowner can prove that the foreclosure was illegal—even void—
meaning that title never passed?8 Can the homeowner remain in
the home? And can the homeowner bring a counterclaim against
the buyer if the buyer had reason to know the foreclosure was void?
The answer to these questions depends on where the home-
owner lives. In many states, before a court evicts a homeowner, it
requires the buyer to prove title. The court also entertains defenses.
But in some states, the homeowner is prohibited from asserting de-
fenses.9 As a result, the buyer does not have to prove title. In these
states, when there is a wrongful foreclosure, the homeowner is al-
most always removed from the home before the court considers legal
title, despite the fact that title would determine right to possession.
Appellate courts in these states—to the extent they have considered
the issue—typically concede this means that a homeowner could be
removed from the home, only to later prove that it was his all along.
Although this may not be ideal, to date, it has been deemed consti-
tutional in those states.10 These courts typically justify the
homeowner’s limited right to defend by noting that homeowners
can file a separate action to adjudicate whether the foreclosure was
legal, and that the unlawful detainer is intended to be an expedited
process.11
This Article addresses the differences between nonjudicial fore-
closure states that allow challenges to unlawful detainers
(“challenge states”) and nonjudicial foreclosure states that do not
(“no-challenge states”). It argues that nonjudicial foreclosure is at
best a porous filter—or an initial sifting—that will not cull out all
the illegal foreclosures that occur. The Article argues that if the
that the person remains the “homeowner” despite foreclosure, I employ the term “home-
owner” throughout.
7. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 534.200, 534.330 (2012).
8. “The distinction between void and voidable is often of great practical importance.
Whenever technical accuracy is required, void can be properly applied only to those provi-
sions that are of no effect whatsoever—those that are an absolute nullity.” Void, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
9. See, e.g., Broken Heart Venture, L.P. v. A & F Rest. Corp., 859 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993).
10. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 457 (Mo. 2013); Curtis v.
Morris, 909 P.2d 460, 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
11. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, 392 S.W.3d at 458.
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unlawful detainer does not require the buyer to prove title and al-
low the homeowner to present defenses, then the unlawful detainer
is equally porous—or employs the same sifting criteria—as nonjudi-
cial foreclosure. As a result, the bona fides of a foreclosure are not
tested prior to eviction, and although a court is ostensibly involved,
it does not function in its typical role. The court does not consider
evidence, allocate burdens of proof, or otherwise resolve disputes;
instead, unlawful detainer in these states is really de facto nonjudi-
cial eviction. This is not only harmful to homeowners, courts, and
society, but also a missed opportunity to use the unlawful detainer
process as a means to keep the efficiencies of nonjudicial foreclo-
sure while improving the accuracy of those foreclosures.
I argue that a two-phase, progressive filtering regime—such as
what exists in challenge states—is superior to what exists in the mi-
nority of states that stubbornly retain no-challenge regimes. In
order to strain out wrongful foreclosures, no-challenge states
should adopt the two stage filtering that occurs in challenge states.
Specifically, the first filter in the system should be nonjudicial
foreclosure. Although this filter lets foreclosures move quickly, it is
only modestly effective at culling the bad from the good. The sec-
ond filter should be a full adjudicative process in unlawful detainer
actions. This second filter should allow for defenses, leave the bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff, and take the time necessary to provide
due process. At this stage, the majority of foreclosures will still pass
through uncontested because the homeowner agrees that the fore-
closure was appropriate. However, for those who suffered a
wrongful foreclosure, the service of process, the right to defend,
and the court’s ability to consider legal and factual disputes will
reduce the number of wrongful foreclosures that become wrongful
evictions. This two-stage, progressive filtering system retains the ex-
pediency of nonjudicial foreclosure for most foreclosures while
better identifying and rejecting illegal foreclosures.12
The remainder of this Article explores these ideas. Part I dis-
cusses the role of the “home” in American jurisprudence and more
generally, in American society. Part II discusses the differences be-
tween judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure in order to establish
context for considering the history of unlawful detainer law and the
split in nonjudicial foreclosure states between those who allow chal-
lenges to title in unlawful detainers (“challenge states”) and those
who do not (“no-challenge states”). Part III chronicles the current
12. To be fair, the idea of two stages of filtering foreclosures is not my own. As discussed
in Part III, several states already employ this method. I have just given it a name and hope-
fully provided some support for the method to be adopted more widely.
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state of the law in each state in an effort to identify the majority
position and legal trend away from no-challenge regimes. Part IV
turns to my normative position. This Part argues that no-challenge
states cause, augment, and concretize harm from wrongful foreclo-
sures. It focuses on how these harms occur to homeowners, courts,
and society as a whole. Finally, Part V proposes basic paths for re-
form and responds to potential critiques of my position. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. HOME AS SACRED PROPERTY
This Article uses the terms “home” and “homeowners.” The fo-
cus is on residential real estate that is used as a primary dwelling.
“Home” can be defined many ways. And there is reasonable debate
about which description is most accurate. There is also debate
about whether the home plays too large a role in American juris-
prudence—particularly Fourth Amendment law—to the detriment
of other spaces that also deserve privacy protections.13 Others argue
that the concept of home is oversimplified, suggesting instead that
how people view their homes and the privacy they expect in them is
nuanced and context specific. I discuss many of these views briefly
below, but do not delve deeply into the debate. My cursory treat-
ment is not meant to diminish the importance of these discussions
for broader legal and sociological questions. However, for purposes
of this Article, a brief treatment suffices.
I have the luxury of taking a pluralistic, even permissive ap-
proach, to the meaning of “home.” This is because, even if only the
basic consensus points in the literature are accepted as true, there is
still considerable agreement around many central tenants of what a
home is, what it means to those who reside in it, and the role it
occupies in the law. Whether home is viewed as personal property,
13. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amend-
ment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 909 (2010) (“Even subjective expectations of privacy suggest a
relative view of home privacy and call into question the privileging of all things residential.
Citizens ascribe much greater intrusiveness to searches of bedrooms, for example, than
searches of home garages, curbside residential garbage, or surveillance of backyards.”); see
also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Au-
tonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted
by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737–39 (1993) (demonstrating empirically that people consider
fly-over searches into their backyard less intrusive than the search of a bedroom). These are
important points, and have intuitive appeal. However, given that foreclosure and eviction
removes a person from the entire structure, these nuanced arguments about context specific
privacy expectations are not germane to this Article.
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a true extension of a person’s psyche, a “castle,”14 or a functional
place for people to live, few disagree that a family’s home is impor-
tant to a person’s physical, emotional, and financial well-being.15
A. Scholarly Concepts of Home
Although subject to minor variations in academic circles, there is
scholarly congruity on many central ideas of what home is. Most
scholars acknowledge that the concept of home involves a physical
structure. And “many scholars agree that home can represent a per-
son’s security, self-identity, and center for social interaction.”16
Home is frequently identified as a place of retreat, safety, relaxa-
tion, freedom, and independence.17 In terms of self-identity, a
home reflects its occupant’s sense of self. It provides space to de-
velop and express identity.18 Some argue that “after the body itself,
the home is seen as the most powerful extension of the psyche.”19
Home is also viewed as a “locus for social relationships.”20 Margaret
Jane Radin—one of the seminal scholars of property and per-
sonhood—captures all this is one sentence. She writes, “There is
both a positive sense that people are bound up with their homes
and a normative sense that this is not fetishistic.”21
With very few exceptions, American law also embraces home ex-
ceptionalism or “home-centric” ideals. Homeowners receive tax
reductions for interest paid on a residential property.22 Bankruptcy
14. The Castle Doctrine is alive and well in many states. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of
the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 662 (2003). For an
early incarnation of the doctrine, see State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 320–21 (1873) (“The idea
that is embodied in the expression that, a man’s house is his castle, is not that it is his property,
and, as such, that he has the right to defend and protect it by other and more extreme means
than he might lawfully use to defend and protect his shop, his office, or his barn. The sense
in which the house has a peculiar immunity is, that it is sacred for the protection of his
person and of his family.”).
15. The role of the home in personhood and dignity is a frequent topic of symposiums.
See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Housing, Personhood, and Dignity, 36 STETSON L. REV. 1 (2006).
16. Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers: Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occu-
pancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 319 (2006).
17. Peter Somerville, The Social Construction of Home, 14 J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLAN. RES.
226, 227 (1997).
18. See Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J. L.
& SOC’Y 580, 593 (2002).
19. See Carole Després, The Meaning of Home: Literature Review and Directions for Future
Research and Theoretical Development, 8 J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLAN. RES. 96, 100 (1991).
20. Ballard, supra note 16, at 284–85.
21. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 987 (1982).
22. I.R.S., PUB. NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION (2014), http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p936.pdf.
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law exempts homes from certain calculations and from forfeiture.23
The home looms large in privacy law, too. Obscene material that
would be illegal if possessed in public is legal in the home.24 And
warrantless arrests in public pass constitutional muster, while war-
rantless arrests in the home do not.25 Even a warrantless thermal
scan of a home violates the law.26 And the home is essential in credi-
tor law. For example, in many states, a creditor cannot collect a
valid judgment against a debtor by a lien on their home.27 If one
needs more proof, entire government programs were enacted in
the last decade to preserve homeownership.28 If this is not “home-
centric” enough, some say that American law should go further.
They argue for housing as a right,29 and note that in most other
Western countries it already is.30
Beyond scholarship and the law, home is central to American
culture and identity. Langston Hughes wrote of a “new skyline in
Harlem” where there “won’t be any more houses where the steps
are creaking . . . .” as a way of describing hope for an entire commu-
nity.31 Harriet Beecher Stowe said, “[H]ome is a place not only of
strong affections, but of entire unreserves; it is life’s undress re-
hearsal, its back-room, its dressing room.”32 And the home has not
23. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2014).
24. “As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power
simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
25. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
26. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 704.710–.730 (2014) (establishing a “homestead
exception” that prevents creditors, in most cases, from forcing the sale of a primary
dwelling).
28. The most obvious example of the government’s desire to preserve homeownership is
HAMP. “The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was created by the Depart-
ment of Treasury (Treasury) in 2009 to encourage modification of residential loans and
avoid foreclosure where possible.” Thomas M. Schehr & Matthew Mitchell, The Home Afforda-
ble Modification Program and A New Wave of Consumer Finance Litigation, 91 MICH. B.J. 38, 38
(2012). Although voluntary for some servicers, the program was compulsory for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program
and Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194, 195 (2011).
29. See generally Kristen David Adams, Do We Need A Right to Housing?, 9 NEV. L.J. 275
(2009).
30. “Of course, most (States) have ratified rights to housing at an international level in a
range of instruments, from the United Nations (UN) to the Council of Europe. Implementa-
tion of these rights is obliged and promoted within both a programmatic approach, as well as
a violations and remedies approach (opportunities for litigation in the event of breaches).”
Padraic Kenna, Housing Rights–The New Benchmarks for Housing Policy in Europe?, 37 URB. LAW.
87, 87 (2005).
31. LANGSTON HUGHES, Hope for Harlem, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES
1, 436–37 (1995).
32. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, LITTLE FOXES 9 (1866), https://archive.org/details/little
foxes00stowgoog.
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escaped popular culture. Miranda Lambert sings the “House That
Built Me”33 about her desire to find herself by returning home.
Phillip Phillips sings of “Home”34 as a place of security, and Crosby,
Stills, Nash & Young sing of a “very, very, very fine house”35 where
everything is easy and domestic bliss is real.36 Even Dorothy knew
there was “no place like home.” American Gothic wouldn’t be the
same without the American Gothic House37 as its backdrop, and
most of us grew up with the promise of the American Dream—com-
plete with a home of our own—as part of the zeitgeist.
Indeed, the concept of home, whether drawn from scholars,
laws, or literature, is sacrosanct. Even writing about it brings feel-
ings of nostalgia and warmth. I note this not to be sentimental, but
to frame what is at stake in this Article. This Article is about losing a
real piece of property called home. But because it is the “home,”
and not an office building—there is more to it. From a positive law
standpoint, the lack of protection for the home in unlawful de-
tainer law is anomalous and inexplicable. And from a normative
perspective, this radical departure from home-centric precepts is
unwise, unfair, and unsustainable.
To understand these arguments, the next two parts provide some
context as to how foreclosures occur in America, and more specifi-
cally, how some states deal with evicting homeowners after the
foreclosure sale.
II. JUDICIAL V. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
Most foreclosures in the United States occur through either a
judicial or nonjudicial process.38 Strict foreclosure, a form of judi-
cial process in which there is no sale of property, is allowed in at
33. Miranda Lambert, The House That Built Me, YOUTUBE (Mar. 31 2010), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=DQYNM6SjD_o.
34. Phillip Phillips, Home, YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HoRkntoHkIE.
35. Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young, Our House, YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2013), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=c7goifK_2qY.
36. There’s ample material to read. But if you enjoy music as I do, these songs might
more effectively call up your own memories of home than any scholarly observations. Enjoy.
37. American Gothic House, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Gothic_
House (last modified Jan. 29, 2015, 5:46 PM).
38. Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez
Time Bomb?, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111, 139 (2013).
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least two states.39 The two main processes are discussed below. Al-
though the nonjudicial system is emphasized in this Article, judicial
foreclosure is discussed in order to show why the issues discussed in
this Article are unique to nonjudicial states.
A. Judicial Foreclosure
Approximately forty percent of states mandate judicial foreclo-
sure.40 In almost all judicial foreclosure states:
[T]he mortgage holder must file an action in court and obtain
a court decree authorizing a foreclosure sale. Generally, the
party seeking to foreclose must establish its standing to do so.
The plaintiff must show that there is a valid mortgage between
the parties and that it is the holder of the mortgage or, other-
wise, is a proper party with authority to foreclose.41
Judicial foreclosure typically entails a lengthy series of steps: (1)
the filing of a foreclosure complaint and lis pendens notice; (2) the
service of process on all parties whose interests may be prejudiced
by the proceeding; (3) a hearing before a judge or a master in
chancery who reports to the court; (4) the entry of a decree or
judgment; (5) the notice of sale; (6) a public foreclosure sale, usu-
ally conducted by a sheriff; (7) the post-sale adjudication as to the
disposition of the foreclosure proceeds; and, if appropriate, (8) the
entry of a deficiency judgment.42
Most pertinent to this Article, in a judicial foreclosure, the home-
owner is allowed to raise defenses to the foreclosure in the
foreclosure proceeding.43 “Once the judgment is final, the usual
doctrines related to finality apply. Because finality doctrines elimi-
nate most or all defenses to the action, they also protect the rights
of the purchaser at the sale and stabilize title.”44
As a result, the unlawful detainer (sometimes called a wrongful
detainer, forcible detainer, or forcible entry action) that follows is
39. Connecticut and Vermont primarily use the strict foreclosure method, while Illinois
allows strict foreclosure under limited circumstances. LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, LAW OF DEBT-
ORS AND CREDITORS § 8:15 (2014).
40. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004).
41. Renuart, supra note 38, at 139.
42. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 40, at 1403.
43. See id.
44. Renuart, supra note 38, at 140.
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quick and typically frictionless since the right to possession has al-
ready been adjudicated. The unlawful detainer is merely a judicial
process to remove people who do not voluntarily leave after the
foreclosure. It avoids self-help, thereby making violence or confron-
tation less likely,45 and it provides a vehicle for damages for the
buyer. A challenge to the underlying foreclosure, and its ability to
pass title to the new buyer, is understandably prohibited as a court
has already considered the validity of the foreclosure in the judicial
foreclosure proceeding.46
B. Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Nonjudicial foreclosure is substantially less complicated and less
costly than judicial foreclosure.47 In fact, proponents often note the
speed of nonjudicial foreclosure as one of its benefits.48 In a nonju-
dicial foreclosure, when a noteholder identifies a default under the
terms of the governing documents (the note and deed of trust), the
noteholder appoints a successor trustee who carries out the foreclo-
sure process.49 “Following a default by the homeowner, the holder
of the mortgage or the trustee named in a deed of trust must give
notice according to the terms of the mortgage or deed of trust and
applicable statutes in order to sell the home.”50 This is rarely the
original trustee identified in the deed of trust. Instead, it is more
common that the noteholder appoints a successor trustee.51
The types of notice include include notification of default, of ac-
celeration, and of the sale.52 The type of notice and how much time
must lapse between the notice and the foreclosure sale differs from
state to state. Most states require publication notice in addition to
45. See, e.g., J. TERRY B. FRIEDMAN ET AL., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: LANDLORD-TENANT ch. 7-A
(2013) (describing the process in the nation’s largest nonjudicial foreclosure state).
46. See, e.g., Lady v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399 N.E.2d 346, 348–49 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (holding that defendant was prohibited from challenging title in the wrongful de-
tainer action and that proper method would be to challenge the validity of the foreclosure in
the judicial foreclosure action).
47. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 40, at 1403.
48. See id. at 1404.
49. Campbell, supra note 4, at 126.
50. Renuart, supra note 38, at 140.
51. Campbell, supra note 4, at 126. In a few nonjudicial states, a trustee is not employed
at all. And in one state, Colorado, the trustee is a public official appointed by the governor.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-104 (2014). Regardless of these differences, the fundamental fact is
that in nonjudicial states, courts do not rule on the appropriateness of foreclosure before it
happens.
52. Renuart, supra note 38, at 140.
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mailed notice. And depending on state law, notice can be provided
and foreclosure completed in twenty to one hundred twenty days.53
California has one of the longest notice periods—three
months—while Missouri has one of the shortest—twenty days.54 To
stop nonjudicial foreclosure, the homeowner must seek an injunc-
tion or raise legal defenses in a separate action.55 Homeowners in
every nonjudicial foreclosure state struggle to find lawyers to re-
present them, because of the financial status of many homeowners
and a genuine deficit of consumer lawyers who navigate foreclosure
law.56 “The shorter the notice period is, the more likely it is that a
homeowner will be unable . . . to take meaningful steps to stop the
foreclosure.”57
The actual foreclosure sale occurs without court involvement.58
The appointed trustee carries out the sale and conveys title to the
buyer.59 A court is involved only if the homeowner files an affirma-
tive action that challenges the foreclosure.60
Just as in judicial foreclosure states, if the homeowner does not
leave his home voluntarily, the buyer initiates an unlawful detainer
action. The purpose is to obtain an order that requires the home-
owner to vacate the property and that awards any appropriate
damages. As discussed in the next Part, states differ on whether or
not a homeowner can raise defenses in an unlawful detainer action.
In many states, the homeowner is prohibited from offering proof
that the foreclosure was improper. This is true even though, unlike
judicial states, no court in nonjudicial states has considered the
53. Campbell, supra note 4, at 126 (alteration in original).
54. Id. at 126 n.167.
55. Renuart, supra note 38, at 141.
56. This fact may be best illustrated by reviewing the website for the National Association
of Consumer Advocates. NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, http://www.consumeradvo-
cates.org. The group is the nation’s largest consumer attorney organization. There are
certainly other attorneys who do consumer work, but NACA attorneys are entirely dedicated
to it and are often leaders in their fields. A search on the “Find an Attorney” page reveals that
in Texas, there are only thirteen attorneys in the entire state who are members of NACA and
who say they are willing to deal with mortgage issues. A few other randomly selected nonjudi-
cial foreclosure states have the following number of comparable attorneys: Mississippi (2);
Missouri (11—and one of them is me); Arizona (5); Nevada (3); Washington (11). Compare
that to the fact that from 2008 to 2011 alone, there were at least twelve million foreclosures.
In 2008, there were 2.3 million properties in foreclosure. In 2009, as the mortgage crisis
continued to build, there was an estimated 2.9 million properties in foreclosure. In 2010, the
number was roughly the same. In 2011, there were 2.7 million more, and in 2012, there were
roughly 1.8 million. NATIONAL FORECLOSURE REPORT, CORELOGIC (2013), http://www.core-
logic.com/downloadable-docs/national-foreclosure-report-august-2013.pdf.
57. Campbell, supra note 4, at 126–27.
58. Id. at 126–29.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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bona fides of the foreclosure. In other states, the unlawful detainer
action works like any other case; the buyer (plaintiff) has the bur-
den of proof, and the homeowner (defendant) has the right to
defend.61 From this point forward, I refer to courts that allow de-
fenses as “challenge states” and those who prohibit defenses as “no-
challenge states.”
Why would any court prohibit a homeowner from defending,
and why it would relieve the buyer—often an institutional investor
or large bank—from proving it has clear title? The answer lies in
the history of unlawful detainers.
III. UNLAWFUL DETAINERS
A. History of Unlawful Detainers in Landlord-Tenant Setting
During this nation’s early years, unlawful detainer proceedings
were common in the landlord-tenant setting.62 Today, they exist in
every state.63 Unlawful detainers are often used to quickly remove
renters from a premise—often less than ten days after the eviction
action.64 This expediency, although favored by landlords, has been
criticized as fundamentally inconsistent with protecting renters’
rights because it prevents renters from raising defenses to
eviction.65
61. Seitz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 909 F.Supp.2d 490 (E.D. Va. 2012); Wayne Inv.
Corp. v. Abbott, 215 N.E.2d 795 (Mass. 1966).
62. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted in a 1912 possession case
that, “[t]ext books and judicial decisions from other states having similar statutes, hold that
the remedy of a mortgagee or trustee is ejectment, not unlawful entry and detainer.” Frum v.
Prickett, 76 S.E. 453, 453 (W. Va. 1912). In 1906, the Supreme Court of Washington reiter-
ated that, “ ‘in view of the fact that this was an action of unlawful detainer, it was necessary
that the conventional relation of landlord and tenant be clearly established.’ It has been
frequently held that title cannot be tried in an action for unlawful entry and detainer.” Meyer
v. Beyer, 86 P. 661, 662 (Wash. 1906). A 1976 article in the Stanford Law Review notes that in
California “virtually all unlawful detainer actions” involve nonpayment of rent from a land-
lord-tenant relationship. Ben H. Logan III & John J. Sabl, The Great Green Hope: The Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 729, 741 n.62 (1976). The article also
notes, “since unlawful detainer actions are summary actions, they are resolved much faster
than other civil suits.” Id. at 739.
63. Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need
for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 137 (2000).
64. Id.
65. Id. (noting that “because the summary procedure for eviction enables the landlord
to enforce the terms of the leasehold within a framework designed for speed rather than
fairness, the relationship largely avoids judicial scrutiny”); see also James H. Backman, The
Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law and in Landlord/Tenant
Law, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 42 (1980) (suggesting alternative dispute resolution); Ken Karas,
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Despite these criticisms, expedited unlawful detainers persist in
rental settings. These actions prohibit a number of inquiries,
mainly inquiries about title.66 The ability to evict a renter without
litigating title dates back to 1381. English landlords were prohibited
from using self-help to recover leased property. As a trade-off for
having to bring an action in court, landlords were not required to
establish title.67
Regardless of its origin, the separation between litigating posses-
sion and litigating title was adopted with vigor in the United States.
Indeed, statutes of forcible entry and detainer were some of the
first laws enacted.68 As Professor Spector of Southern Methodist
University explains, in these actions “possession was the primary
substantive issue, and the primary remedy available was the return
of possession, reflecting the principle developed in the ancient law
of real property that possession ends the dispute.”69 Spector also
notes that in addition to relying upon traditional separations be-
tween possession and actual ownership, unlawful detainer
proceedings limited issues that could be pleaded or raised as de-
fenses because courts of law and equity were split.70 One dispute
was commonly resolved by two separate actions.71 Thus, unlawful
detainer actions were streamlined, limited proceedings. Litigants
could only bring narrow claims and defendants were not allowed to
bring counterclaims, add parties, or raise defenses.72 Although the
law and equity slowly dissolved in most courts the mid-nineteenth
century, the piecemeal approach to landlord-tenant law persisted.
An astute observer might wonder whether this piecemeal adjudi-
cation of rights is constitutional. The United States Supreme Court
Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 553–60 (1991) (discussing right to counsel); Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s
Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 562–89 (1988) (right to counsel).
66. See Hallquist v. United Home Loans, Inc., 715 F.3d 1040, 1047 (8th Cir. 2013) (con-
firming that a party “cannot challenge title issues in an unlawful-detainer action, as it
adjudicates only lawful possession”); Reynolds v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 245 S.W.3d 57, 60
(Tex. App. 2008) (“The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual posses-
sion. The merits of title are not to be adjudicated.”); Sav. Bank of Puget Sound v. Mink, 741
P.2d 1043, 1046 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (“In order to protect the summary nature of the
unlawful detainer proceedings, other claims, including counterclaims, are generally not
allowed . . . .”).
67. See Spector, supra note 63, at 142–52, for a detailed discussion of this history.
68. Id. at 152.
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id. at 154.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 157–58.
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answered that question—at least in the rental setting.73 In Lindsey v.
Normet, a tenant argued that Oregon’s unlawful detainer law, which
prohibited most defenses, was unconstitutional because it denied
due process to renters.74 The United States Supreme Court held
that Oregon’s process was constitutional.75 Although the tenant was
barred from raising the defense that the landlord maintained the
premises, the landlord was also barred from claiming back rent or
asserting other claims.76 The Court explained, “The tenant is
barred from raising claims in the FED (forcible entry and detainer)
action that the landlord has failed to maintain the premises, but the
landlord is also barred from claiming back rent or asserting other
claims against the tenant.”77 Further, “the tenant is not foreclosed
from instituting his own action against the landlord and litigating
his right to damages or other relief in that action.”78 This reason-
ing, that a limited action is appropriate so long as the remaining
rights can be litigated in another case, has survived even if its un-
derlying rationale is questionable. As discussed in Part V—which
includes my proposed solutions and some discussion of opposing
views—no-challenge regimes have been contested on constitutional
grounds, and when they survive, are often justified on the same
grounds as in the rental context: a homeowner can pursue his rem-
edies in a separate action.79
Because unlawful detainer in the rental setting is constitutional,
there is little incentive for states to change. As a result, although
73. See Martin-Bragg v. Moore, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“Each of
these cases reflect the courts’ recognition that when complex issues of title are involved, the
parties’ constitutional rights to due process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordi-
nated to the summary procedures of unlawful detainer.”) (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 64–66 (1972));  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 459 (Mo. 2013)(“Re-
quirement that mortgagors assert claims regarding title in separate action did not violate
mortgagors’ procedural due process rights.”); Andries v. Covey, 113 P.3d 483, 485 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005) (“A constitutional challenge to the limitations of the unlawful detainer proceed-
ings [does] not have merit, because the counterclaiming party could raise his claims in some
other, proper proceeding.”); Sav. Bank of Puget Sound v. Mink, 741 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987) (“The right to raise a particular counterclaim in a special proceeding such as
an unlawful detainer action is not a fundamental right that is protected by either the state or
federal constitution.”).
74. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“Since the purpose of the Oregon Forci-
ble Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute is constitutionally permissible and since the
classification under attack is rationally related to that purpose, the statute is not repugnant to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 65–66.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 457 (Mo. 2013).
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policy moved towards favoring joinder of claims80 and statutes cre-
ated class actions and mass actions to eliminate excessive
litigation,81 in the unlawful detainer setting it is perfectly normal for
one action to determine the right to possession and another action
to determine damages.82 Indeed, in states like Oregon, a renter
could prove that a landlord failed to maintain the premises, pre-
sumably allowing the renter to recover back rent as damages, even
though that same renter was removed from the apartment for fail-
ure to pay rent owed.
If this sounds strange or inefficient, it pales in comparison to the
odd results that occur in no-challenge states, described in the fol-
lowing sections.
B. Unlawful Detainers in the Foreclosure Setting
Historically, most unlawful detainer statutes did not apply to
foreclosures. They specifically referenced landlords and tenants. As
a result, the obvious path to removing a homeowner from a home
was eviction. However, eviction actions allow for litigation of many
issues, and they do not limit defenses the way unlawful detainers do.
As a result, for at least the last fifty years, purchasers at foreclosure
sales have used unlawful detainer laws to evict foreclosed
homeowners.
The transmutation of unlawful detainer actions from landlord-
tenant cases to mortgage cases was initially accomplished through
creative lawyering and judging. One clever way took advantage of
the fact that some deeds of trust state that the trustee, who holds
legal title to the property until the note is satisfied, rents the prop-
erty to the homeowner. In these cases, the deed typically sets the
80. See Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule
19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1985) (“There is a strong movement in federal court litiga-
tion toward ‘packaging’ all aspects of a controversy into a single lawsuit. Rules in three
areas—joinder, supplemental jurisdiction, and claim preclusion—increasingly mandate the
joinder of all persons interested in, and all claims arising from, a single transaction. Such
packaging promotes efficient dispute resolution by avoiding repetitive, piecemeal litigation
and by binding all interested persons to a single judgment.”).
81. See generally 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1780 (3d ed.).
82. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 454 (Mo. 2013) (“[A]ny claims
regarding the validity of title or seeking damages related to invalid assertions of title must be
brought in a separate action” from the unlawful detainer action.”).
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rent at one cent per month.83 And courts have reasoned based on
such language that the subsequent buyer, who assumes the rights of
the previous mortgagee, can rely upon the unlawful detainer statute
in order to evict the “renter”—who is really the homeowner.84
There are some obvious flaws in this reasoning. Chief among them
is the fact that the trustee never collected rent (which might consti-
tute waiver) and that a new deed of trust applies to the buyer
(which means the buyer doesn’t stand in the shoes of the previous
owner or trustee). Regardless, perhaps due to familiarity with un-
lawful detainer laws and desire to expedite evictions, attorneys
argued, and courts accepted, this position in some states.85
Other states found a different path. For example, Arizona courts
concluded that “one who remains in possession of property after
termination of his interest under a deed of trust is a tenant at will or
sufferance.”86 As a result, the Arizona unlawful detainer statute ap-
plied to tenants “at will or by sufferance,” and thereby, the unlawful
detainer process was applicable.87
In recent times, the application of unlawful detainer statutes to
foreclosures required less creativity. A number of states amended
their unlawful detainer statutes to specifically include homeowners
who remained in the home after foreclosure.88 These amendments
often involved nothing more than adding a phrase to the existing
statute, so that it covered the foreclosure setting. This created real
challenges because much of the remaining statutory language was
based on a presumption of landlord/tenant relations; it did not rec-
ognize or consider the potential for bona fide disputes over who
owned the property to begin with. Nonetheless, in a troubling ex-
ample of path dependency, in some cases the entire statutory
83. See FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html. This
webpage contains sample deeds of trust approved by Fannie Mae. Many deeds of trust con-
tain this language. The author relied upon a deed of trust from Missouri. Interestingly, this
language does not appear in every deed of trust on the Fannie Mae website.
84. See, e.g., AgriBank FCB v. Cross Timbers Ranch, 919 S.W.2d 256, 261–62 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996).
85. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 281 (Tex. App.
2015).
86. Andreola v. Arizona Bank, 550 P.2d 110, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
87. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 12-1173(1) (2014)).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 5445 (1919) (“If an occupant refuses possession to purchaser at a
judicial sale under trust deed, the purchasers can recover possession of the property in an
action of unlawful detainer.”); Robert Sweere, The No Counterclaim Rule in Unlawful Detainer
Proceedings, 68 J. MO. B. 162 (2012). Examples of amended statutes include N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 540:12 (2014) (“The owner, lessor, or purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale of any tene-
ment or real estate may recover possession thereof from a lessee, occupant, [or]
mortgagor . . . .”).
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language was carried over from the rental setting to the mortgage
setting.89
Regardless of the method, the result has been that, in most
states, unlawful detainer proceedings apply to the mortgage con-
text. This, in and of itself, might not be a problem. Some states,
despite concluding that unlawful detainer procedures apply to fore-
closures, do not let the expedited nature of the proceedings
prevent a homeowner from challenging the basic elements of the
unlawful detainer.90 These “challenge states” are discussed in Sub-
section 1. Other states take a harsher approach, concluding that the
homeowner—now a defendant in the unlawful detainer—can do
little or nothing to defend himself. These are “no-challenge states.”
They are discussed in Subsection 2.
1. Challenge States
Although most states have laws that ostensibly prohibit chal-
lenges to unlawful detainers, a number of courts in those states
softened this approach in the last decade.91 This is most likely be-
cause the mortgage crisis revealed ample evidence that hundreds of
thousands, even millions, of foreclosures are fundamentally
flawed,92 making it difficult to assume that all buyers at foreclosure
sales acquire legal title.93
In these emerging “challenge states,” unlawful detainers are still
considered limited actions, but courts allow the defendant to at
least defend on the grounds that the party seeking to remove the
homeowner is not the legal owner at all.94 Homeowners are still
prohibited from inserting ancillary claims, but they can require the
plaintiff to prove its case, and they can mount a defense.95 The over-
arching reasoning in these cases is that if the action turns wholly on
who has a right to possession, that question can only be answered
by first deciding who the rightful owner is. The language of these
decisions can be awkward precisely because courts try to balance
89. For example, Missouri kept its entire statutory scheme, but made it include foreclo-
sures by adding language that made the unlawful detainer law apply when “a mortgage or
deed of trust has been foreclosed.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 534.030 (2015).
90. See. e.g., Seitz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 909 F.Supp.2d 490 (E.D. Va. 2012); Wayne
Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 215 N.E.2d 795 (Mass. 1966).
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See, e.g., About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-FED. NAT’L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
93. See Renuart, supra note 38, at 136.
94. See, e.g., Seitz, 909 F.Supp.2d at 490; Wayne Inv. Corp., 215 N.E.2d at 795.
95. See, e.g., id.
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equitable considerations with statutory language that ostensibly cur-
tails the right to defend. This legal yoga makes for some real
stretches, but produces a result that is more desirable than adher-
ence to rigid rules because it is consistent with other home
jurisprudence, values process over expediency, and avoids ratifying
wrongful foreclosures through a quasi-judicial system. One is re-
minded of Professor Carol Rose’s “crystals and mud,” in which Rose
argued that crystals—bright line law—may not be as desirable as
mud—malleable law.
The type of muddy legal reasoning required to work around stat-
utory prohibitions on inquiry into title is on full display in a recent
Virginia case.96 In Seitz v. Federal National Mortgage Association, when
faced with an explicit prohibition against “trying the title,” the
court reasoned that:
Under Virginia law, although a court, in an unlawful detainer
case, may not “try the title” in the sense of determining who, as
against all others, has title to the property, it is permitted to
adjudicate issues concerning title, at least, insofar as those is-
sues bear on the right to possession as between the parties to
the unlawful detainer action.97
A fair observer might say that this is slicing it pretty thin, but the
distinction between a true quiet title action and deciding superior
title between litigants allowed the court to avoid evicting a home-
owner who might have a superior claim to possession.
Other courts have been more transparent in their reasoning. For
example, in Wayne Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held in a one-paragraph opinion that “the purpose of sum-
mary process is to enable the holder of the legal title to gain
possession of premises wrongfully withheld. Right to possession
must be shown and legal title may be put in issue.”98 Similarly, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals recently held that the unlawful de-
tainer statute was constitutional, but only because “[t]here is
absolutely no doubt that wrongful foreclosure can be raised as an
affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought by the
purchaser of property in foreclosure.”99
96. Seitz, 909 F.Supp.2d at 490.
97. Id. at 500.
98. Wayne Inv. Corp., 215 N.E.2d at 795.
99. CitiMortage, Inc. v. Drake, 410 S.W.3d 797, 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
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In all, despite relatively consistent statutory language limiting the
right to try title, nineteen states have allowed homeowners to de-
fend in unlawful detainers. These states are the following:
Alabama,100 Arkansas,101 Alaska,102 California,103 Colorado,104 Geor-
gia,105 Idaho,106 Massachusetts,107 Michigan,108 Mississippi,109
100. Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP., 159 So. 3d 31, 41 (Ala. 2013) (holding that
any issues regarding bidders’ right to possession of property bought at foreclosure auctions
go to the question of whether bidders could prove the element of the right to possession in
their ejectment actions and trial courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear any cause of
action problems).
101. Webb v. Herpin, 233 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Ark. 1950) (holding that a defendant had the
right to do more than simply offer a bare denial of the plaintiff’s claim for title and that the
best way to do this would be to offer proof that the defendant owned the property).
102. Pac. Coast Co. v. Brown, 2 Alaska 621, 623 (D. Alaska Dec. 4, 1905) (holding that
since law and equity are merged in Alaska, equitable challenges to title may be raised).
103. Wood v. Herson, 114 Cal. Rptr. 365, 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (“[T]he problem of
determining at what point the unlawful detainer proceeding has provided the means of liti-
gating equitable attacks by the defendant therein on plaintiff’s title has been resolved with
varying results.”).
104. Colorado’s last ruling on this issue is dated. See McCrimmon v. Raymond, 234 P.
1058, 1058 (Colo. 1925) (holding that equitable defenses may be interposed in unlawful
detainers).
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Christian, 576 S.E.2d 894, 895–96 (Ga. 2003) (“A plaintiff in an
ejectment action, in order to recover, must establish that at the time of filing his action, he
possesses legal title or its equivalent, as well as the right of entry.”). The court went on to
conclude that defects in the title transfer during foreclosure meant the plaintiff could not
prove its claim.
106. See, e.g., PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 200 P.3d 1180, 1186 (Idaho 2009)
(considering the doctrine of after-acquired title to determine whether the plaintiff actually
received clear title from the foreclosure sale).
107. See, e.g., Wayne Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 215 N.E.2d 795, 795 (Mass. 1966) (holding that
the purpose of summary process to obtain possession of premises purchased by mortgagee at
foreclosure sale is to enable the legal title holder to gain possession of the wrongfully with-
held premises, but a right to possession must be shown and legal title may be put in issue).
108. Michigan is an odd case, but I hesitantly list it here. Michigan appears to use eviction
actions instead of unlawful detainers. These allow the litigation of title. See, e.g., Bryan v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, 848 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). However, this case also
makes clear that if a homeowner does not exercise the right to statutory redemption within
one year of foreclosure, even if the homeowner brings a claim for wrongful foreclosure dur-
ing that time, they lose the right to pursue the claim. As such, Michigan is a “challenge” state,
but it is unclear whether that challenge becomes moot after one year if there is no effort to
reinstate.
109. White v. Usry, 800 So. 2d 125, 128 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (allowing a claim for forci-
ble entry and detainer to be converted into a claim for quiet title when defendant pleaded
counterclaims asserting it had legal title to property); see also McCallum v. Gavin, 116 So. 94,
95 (Miss. 1928) (“Often, however, the right and extent of possession is determined by title
deeds. This judgment, involving possession alone, does not adjudicate the title in any sense
so as to be res adjudicata upon the question of title, but such deeds are often admissible for
the purpose of possession.”) (citing Murf v. Maupin, 74 So. 614, 615 (Miss. 1917)).
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Montana,110 Nebraska,111 North Carolina,112 Oregon,113 South Da-
kota,114 Tennessee,115 Utah,116 Virginia,117 and Washington.118
2. No-Challenge States
In no-challenge states, courts have hewn tightly to the statutory
language, even if it produces troubling results. These courts typi-
cally quote language from the statute and landlord–tenant cases to
support their positions.119 The language most often quoted involves
110. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Patrick, No. DA 10-0064, 2010 WL 4967980, at *2 (Mont.
Dec. 7, 2010) (reversing summary judgment for a buyer because there was no evidence in the
record to establish title, and the defendant at least facially contested it); State ex rel. Hamshaw
v. Justice’s Court of Union Twp., 88 P.2d 1, 5 (Mont. 1939).
111. I have classified Nebraska as a challenge state. This is technically wrong, but func-
tionally right. In Nebraska, if a party raises a challenge to title, it divests the court hearing the
detainer action of jurisdiction, resulting in a dismissal. This effectively works as allowing
homeowners to challenge title by forcing a new action in a new court where title can be
adjudicated. See, e.g., Cummins Mgmt., L.P. v. Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d 538, 542–43 (Neb. 2003).
112. See, e.g., Chandler v. Cleveland Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 211 S.E.2d 484, 488 (N.C. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that a party in a summary eviction proceeding has the right to challenge title,
but is not required to do so).
113. Option One Mortg. Corp. v. Wall, 977 P.2d 408, 410 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (“[Oregon
statutory law] expressly allows title to real property to be ‘controverted or questioned’ but
not ‘determined’ by the district court. Indeed, an FED court has authority to consider issues
regarding title ‘insofar as necessary for determination of possession,’ but the judgment may
not determine how those issues affect title.”). Rhode Island is omitted from both the chal-
lenge and no-challenge list. Although Rhode Island has procedures for nonjudicial
foreclosure, many foreclosures still involve judicial proceedings. As a result, it is difficult to
classify.
114. See, e.g., Heiser v. Rodway, 247 N.W.2d 65, 68 (S.D. 1976) (“[T]he right . . . to be
heard on relevant matters, . . . as well as the desirable purpose of preventing a multiplicity of
suits, is, and must be, superior to the desire to provide a speedy remedy for possession.”).
115. See, e.g., CitiMortage, Inc. v. Drake, 410 S.W.3d 797, 807–08 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)
(“[W]rongful foreclosure is a defense to an unlawful detainer brought by a purchaser in
foreclosure.”).
116. See Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 241 P.3d 375, 382 (Utah Ct. App.
2010) (analyzing each of defendant’s challenges to title and rejecting each, but not asserting
at any point that such defenses were inappropriate).
117. See, e.g., Seitz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 909 F.Supp.2d 490, 500 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(“[Although it cannot determine who has title to property, a court in an unlawful detainer
action is] “permitted to adjudicate issues concerning title, at least, insofar as those issues bore
on the right to possession as between the parties to the unlawful detainer action . . . . [in the
unlawful detainer action at issue, the mortgagor had] asserted, as a defense, that the foreclo-
sure was invalid and that, therefore, he [was] entitled to possession.”).
118. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Ostrander, 491 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Wash. Ct. App.
1971) (“Due to the trial court’s limited jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, set-offs
or counterclaims have not been allowed. However, affirmative equitable defenses have been
permitted.”).
119. See, e.g., Kransky v. Hensleigh, 409 P.2d 537, 537–40 (Mont. 1965) (“The occupancy
of premises by one person with the consent . . . of the person entitled to assert a right to the
possession of the premises, creates between the parties the [implied] relation of landlord
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explicit prohibitions on challenging title.120 It also demands expedi-
ency, referring to the actions as “summary proceedings.”121
Compounding the problems created by the statutory language,
many courts focus on precedent to interpret these statutes, even if
that precedent largely developed in a landlord-tenant atmosphere.
This precedent often severely limits adding parties or raising
counterclaims.122
The result is that in these no-challenge states, there is little that
can be done by a defendant, and almost nothing that needs to be
proven by a plaintiff to cause an eviction. After all, unlawful detain-
ers are actions to prove that a party is wrongfully possessing
property owned by another. However, if the ownership of the prop-
erty cannot be litigated, there is little to do but evict the current
resident. Indeed, in a foreclosure setting, the combination of sum-
mary proceedings, prohibitions on inquiry into title, and dramatic
and tenant . . . [The bona fide purchasers are therefore] entitled to bring unlawful detainer
action upon [a] refusal to pay rent after demand.”); see also Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Nev. 2013) (“The primary purpose of an unlawful detainer
action is to . . . give possession [of property] to one from whom it is unlawfully being with-
held. Consistent with this purpose, a person who obtains title to property at a trustee’s sale
may remove holdover tenants by means of an unlawful detainer action under NRS
40.255(1)(c).”).
120. For a statutory example, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1177 (2014) (“On the trial of
an action of forcible entry or forcible detainer, the only issue shall be the right of actual
possession and the merits of title shall not be inquired into.”). For examples of similar case
law, see Cummins Mgmt., L.P. v. Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Neb. 2003) (“Because of its
summary nature, the Legislature has narrowed the issues that can be tried in a forcible entry
and detainer action . . . The action does not try the question of title, but only the immediate
right of possession . . . [T]he district court’s jurisdiction arises out of legislative grant, and it
is inherently limited by that grant.”); see also Hallquist v. United Home Loans, Inc., 715 F.3d
1040, 1047 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that under Missouri law, title issues cannot be chal-
lenged in an unlawful-detainer action, as it adjudicates only lawful possession); Chapman v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Nev. 2013) (“[unlawful detainer] pro-
ceedings are summary and their scope limited . . . ‘title to property cannot be an issue in such
actions . . . even though such pleading and proof may incidentally involve the question of
title.’”); Reynolds v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ex rel. Freemont Inv. & Loan SABR 2005-FR1, 245
S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tex. App. 2008) (“To the extent that Appellant is arguing that notice of
foreclosure was not proper, the issue is beyond the scope of the proceedings below. The only
issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession. The merits of title are not
to be adjudicated.”); Andries v. Covey, 113 P.3d 483, 485 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]n un-
lawful detainer action ‘is a narrow one, limited to the question of possession . . . . [sic] [and]
to protect the summary nature of the unlawful detainer proceedings, other claims, including
counterclaims, are generally not allowed.’ [Additionally], a constitutional challenge to the
limitations of the unlawful detainer proceedings [does] not have merit, because the counter-
claiming party could raise his claims in some other, proper proceeding.”); Sav. Bank of Puget
Sound v. Mink, 741 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (“In order to protect the sum-
mary nature of the unlawful detainer proceedings, other claims, including counterclaims, are
generally not allowed.”) (quoting Munden v. Hazelrigg, 711 P.2d 295, 298 (1985)).
121. Id.
122. See Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 435 (Tex. App. 2007); see also
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 455 (Mo. 2013).
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limitations on the right to pursue affirmative defenses or counter-
claims stacks the deck against the homeowner and guarantees that
these “proceedings” are predetermined in favor of the new
buyer.123
In fact, the “summary proceeding” language tends to encourage
courts to expedite timeframes and to limit discovery, meaning that
most cases are decided on summary judgment.124 Similarly, unlaw-
ful detainers are often set in bulk dockets in dozens or hundreds of
other cases, making it less likely that a court will examine the facts
and law, even if it arguably could find a way to do so.125
The limits on inquiry into title, often framed as completely
prohibiting it, present a daunting problem to defendants. Even if
the former homeowner believes that the foreclosure was void—
meaning it does not have legal significance and in fact never did—
this cannot be raised as a defense in an unlawful detainer proceed-
ing.126 Though the homeowner might have evidence showing that
the party seeking to evict him has no legal title, the law prohibits
the court from considering that evidence.127 Instead, the court is
compelled to enter judgment for the plaintiff in the unlawful de-
tainer, allowing the eviction of the homeowner. The common law
limits on counterclaims and affirmative defenses have similar effect,
and further signal to the court that it should not decide the issues
that might determine property ownership,128 converting the court
into little more than a rubber stamp.
The result of the no-challenge unlawful detainer is that unless a
homeowner can file an affirmative action and stay the resolution of
123. See, e.g., Martin-Bragg v. Moore, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(“The unlawful detainer law’s provisions for summary determination of the right to posses-
sion would be lost if the lawsuit were to be transformed into an ordinary action at law
involving complex issues of title to the property. ‘[A]n action for unlawful detainer can co-
exist with other causes of action in the same complaint,’ it has been held, but only ‘so long as
the entire case is treated as an ordinary civil action, not as a summary proceeding.’”) (quot-
ing Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper, 267 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Fannie Mae v. Truong, 361 S.W.3d 400, 404–05 (Mo. 2012) (“We acknowledge
Truong has been dispossessed of his home and firmly believes he can demonstrate his legal
right to possession is superior to that of Fannie Mae. In light of this assertion, this Court
laments the harshness of this result. Unlawful detainer proceedings are summary in nature
and the ordinary rules and proceedings of other civil actions do not apply.”); Wells Fargo
Bank, 392 S.W.3d at 454 (“Missouri courts repeatedly have stated that equitable defenses and
counterclaims are not permitted in response to [unlawful detainer actions].”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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the unlawful detainer,129 it is entirely possible for the homeowner to
lose the home, only to later prove in a separate case that the home
was his all along.
The homeowner is not the only one who may feel helpless. Trial
courts that hear unlawful detainers are equally bound. Oftentimes,
a court cannot entertain the most meritorious assertion that the
foreclosure, purportedly passing title to the new owner, was illegal.
Even if a new owner is the same as the party who allegedly wrong-
fully foreclosed (such as when a bank buys the house it foreclosed
on at the foreclosure sale), the court cannot entertain counter-
claims by the homeowner relating to problems with the foreclosure,
loan origination, or servicing. The court may genuinely believe that
the homeowner is the rightful legal owner, but still be required to
evict that homeowner and assess damages. Some courts have ex-
pressed frustration at having their powers circumscribed by
statute.130
At present, there are eight no-challenge states. These states
are: Arizona,131 Minnesota132, Missouri,133 Nevada,134 New Hamp-
129. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, 392 S.W.3d at 461 (“As a result of this statutory limitation
on the substantive scope of unlawful detainer actions, homeowners who believe their foreclo-
sures are improper must act to protect themselves if they do not want to lose possession of
their home. They must either: (1) sue to enjoin the foreclosure sale from occurring, or (2) if
the sale has occurred and the buyer has sued for unlawful detainer, bring a separate action
challenging the foreclosure purchaser’s title and seek a stay of the unlawful detainer action
in that separate case.”).
130. For example, one trial court judge in Missouri indicated that he thought it unlikely
he would strike the statute as unconstitutional, but he explained that he understood how
strange it was that a party could evict someone without offering any proof of title. He said, “I
understand the problems inherent in the statute that says you can’t defend the case on the
basis that the party that’s suing you—Mickey Mouse [sic] who claims he’s got a deed on your
house and he wants to evict you.” Appellants’ Brief at 45, Wells Fargo Bank, 392 S.W.3d (Mo.
2013) (No. SC92649), 2012 WL 6825485, at *45.
131. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1177 (2014) (“On the trial of an action of forcible
entry or forcible detainer, the only issue shall be the right of actual possession and the merits
of title shall not be inquired into.”). See also Curtis v. Morris, 909 P.2d 460, 463–64 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (overruling a previous case that would have allowed title to be considered in
forcible entry and detainer actions); Fenter v. Homestead Dev. & Trust Co., 413 P.2d 579,
582 (Az. Ct. App. 1966) (“The equitable defense of estoppel may not be asserted since this
defense is in nature of the assertion of an encumbrance upon the property involved in this
case and that is the type of question which should be resolved in an action to quiet title.”);
Reeves v. City of Phoenix, 400 P.2d 364, 367 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (recognizing that the
decision on the forcible detainer action before this Court was not definitive of the issues in a
then-pending quiet title action relating to the same property, and that the forcible detainer
action was decided without prejudice to the quiet title action).
132. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Kraus, No. A14-0922, 2015 WL 134180, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 12, 2015) (holding that a party in an eviction proceeding was not entitled to raise the
validity of the foreclosure as a defense).
133. Wells Fargo Bank, 392 S.W.3d at 457.
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shire,135 Texas,136 West Virginia,137 and Wyoming.138
IV. NO CHALLENGE STATES CAUSE, ENHANCE,
AND CONCRETIZE HARM
Although there is a genuine debate about whether nonjudicial
foreclosure is the best way to deal with alleged default, this Part
asserts that there is very little that can be said in defense of coupling
nonjudicial foreclosure with no-challenge regimes. Nonjudicial
foreclosure is expedient, but by its very nature, it is less likely to
catch mistakes than a judicial review, which occurs in judicial fore-
closure states. In a purely economic model, some errors are
acceptable when these errors are rare and outweighed by the gains
of efficiently turning non-performing notes, and non-paying home-
owners, into performing loans and new, responsible homeowners.
Much like Learned Hand’s tort formula (B < PL),139 some might
argue that there is some point where seeking to making the foreclo-
sure system even more accurate is outweighed by the cost of doing
so.
But even if we assume that nonjudicial foreclosure is economi-
cally rational, preventing the limited number of homeowners from
challenging a wrongful foreclosure at the unlawful detainer stage is
neither consistent with existing law nor desirable from legally and
socially normative perspectives. Specifically, the process of prevent-
ing challenges to nonjudicial foreclosure in an unlawful detainer:
(1) makes the potential harm of inaccurate foreclosures perma-
nent; (2) runs against notions of judicial efficiency; (3) suppresses
valid claims that could serve to disincentive banks from engaging in
wrongful foreclosures; and (4) erodes confidence in the legitimacy
of the courts.
134. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Nev. 2013) (“[I]t has
universally been held that title to property cannot be an issue in such actions . . . even though
such pleading and proof may incidentally involve the question of title.”).
135. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:17.
136. “The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession. The
merits of title are not to be adjudicated.” Reynolds v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 245 S.W.3d 57,
60 (Tex. App. 2008) (“Splitting jurisdiction between courts, the ultimate question of title can
be determined in district court.”); Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557
(Tex. App. 2001).
137. Tribeca Lending Corp. v. McCormick, 745 S.E.2d 493, 496 (W. Va. 2013)
138. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 207 (Wyo. 1969).
139. B<PL is the formula that Judge Hand proposed to determine the standard of care
for the tort of negligence. Essentially, if the Burden < Probability of Occurrence × Cost of
Injury, then the standard of care has not been met. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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A. Harm to Individuals
Nonjudicial foreclosure, in and of itself, causes some injury, but
those injuries are enhanced and concretized by no-challenge re-
gimes. As previously discussed, a nonjudicial foreclosure happens
without judicial review of the merits of the foreclosure. This inad-
vertently allows more errors and requires less fact checking by the
foreclosing entity. All the problems experienced in judicial states
occur more frequently in nonjudicial states. These problems in-
clude robo-signing,140 inappropriate allocation of payments,141 and
in one infamous case, foreclosure on a home that had no loan at
all.142 These wrongful foreclosures, even if they do not result in evic-
tion, cause stress and damage credit. The impact varies, depending
on a consumer’s credit at the time of foreclosure.143
Similarly, regardless of whether a nonjudicial state allows chal-
lenges or not, nonjudicial foreclosure happens faster, making it
harder for homeowners to locate counsel and identify and obtain
new housing. In all nonjudicial foreclosure states, homeowners typi-
cally have less time to prepare for foreclosure sales and possibly
seek new housing.
Consequently, homeowners in nonjudicial states who suffer a
wrongful foreclosure experience similar problems regardless of
whether they are in challenge or no-challenge regimes. But, the
overall impact of wrongful foreclosures differs amongst those re-
gimes. No-challenge regimes in some instances cause, and in all
instances enhance and reify, the harm of wrongful foreclosures.144
As an example, for a homeowner who faces a wrongful foreclo-
sure but can remain in his home while contesting the unlawful
detainer (challenge state), a diminished credit score might impact
140. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 106. Robo-signing is the process of producing docu-
ments to support foreclosure that are fraudulent, either because they are forged or because
they were signed with people with no personal knowledge of the file.
141. Id.
142. See Harriet Johnson Brackey, Lauderdale Man’s Home Sold Out from Under Him in Fore-
closure Mistake, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.) (Sept. 23, 2010), http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/2010-09-23/business/fl-wrongful-foreclosure-0922-20100921_1_foreclosure-de-
fense-attorney-foreclosure-case-jumana-bauwens; Joshua Rhett Miller, Bank of America to Pay
Florida Couple in Mistaken Foreclosure Case, FOX NEWS (June 6, 2011), http://www.foxnews
.com/us/2011/06/06/bank-america-pays-florida-couple-in-mistaken-foreclosure-case.
143. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT
REPORTING SYSTEM (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-report-
ing-white-paper.pdf.
144. I note here that problems produced by no-challenge states also disproportionately
impact minorities, because foreclosures in general disproportionately affect minorities. Stud-
ies that map foreclosures onto neighborhoods show this fact vividly. This is due in large part
to the fact that minorities are given far more subprime loans per capita than whites.
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credit card rates or an effort to buy a new car. But it will not make
finding a new home impossible because the homeowner is not
evicted while he defends the unlawful detainer. The same cannot
be said for no-challenge states, where a homeowner will have to
find new housing immediately. Foreclosures will remain on a home-
owner’s credit report for a period of seven years.145 Generally credit
scores can be rehabilitated two years following the action; however,
this only happens when the foreclosure is an isolated event. Since
most foreclosures correspond with escalating interest rates and
other defaults that push the individual deeper into debt, the score
rehabilitation likely doesn’t happen right at the two-year mark for
most individuals.146 In general, credit scores are central to a per-
son’s ability to rent or buy a residence,147 and credit scores below
620 are considered poor.148 As a result, no-challenge states make
the full impact of diminished credit felt before determining whether
the homeowner has legal title to the home. This leads to many
problems, including, in some of the worst cases, homelessness.149
Beyond the fundamental need to find housing, no-challenge
states amplify other problems associated with wrongful foreclosures.
A homeowner will almost certainly deplete resources on higher
rent, a higher security deposit, increased costs of commuting, and
the like.150 And he and his family will wrestle with significant life
145. MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/questions/foreclosure-fico-
score-affect.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); TRANSUNION, https://www.transunion.com/per-
sonal-credit/customer-support/faqs/credit-basics.page (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
146. Foreclosure Affects More Than Just Your Credit, CONSUMER EDUC. SERVS., INC., http://
www.cesisolutions.org/resources/credit-and-debt-resource-center/consequences-of-foreclo-
sure/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
147. Credit scores also impact individuals’ ability to procure employment (as many em-
ployers run credit scores), insurance rates, security clearances, rates on credit cards, as well as
their ability to buy a car and a whole host of other important issues.
148. This website is consistent with most that identify credit score ranges such as the
following: Excellent Credit: 750–850, Good Credit: 700–749, Fair Credit: 650–699, Poor
Credit: 600–649, Bad Credit: Below 600. Gerri Detweiler, What Is a Bad Credit Score?, CREDIT
.COM (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.credit.com/credit-scores/what-is-a-bad-credit-score/.
149. See FORECLOSURE AND HOMELESSNESS: UNDERSTANDING THE CONNECTION, INST. FOR
CHILDREN, POVERTY, & HOMELESSNESS (2013), http://www.icphusa.org/filelibrary/ICPH_pol-
icybrief_ForeclosuresandHomelessness.pdf; Theresa Walker, New O.C. Program Helps Homeless
People Fix Their Credit, ORANGE CTY. REGISTER (July 7, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.ocregister
.com/articles/credit-670370-hope-village.html. Some who study this issue report that the
foreclosure crisis is contributing to an increase in homelessness. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN
SMITH & DAVID PRICE, THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES, THE
URBAN INS. (2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411909_impact_of_forclosures
.pdf.
150. Foreclosure-Response.org is a joint project of the Urban Institute, the Center for
Housing Policy, and the Local Initiatives Support Corporation. Its website provides nation-
wide foreclosure data with a focus on foreclosure prevention and neighborhood stabilization.
Understand Why Foreclosures Matter: Ways Foreclosures Affect Families, FORECLOSURE-RESPONSE.ORG,
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disruption.151 If he relied on public transit, the routes may change
or may be non-existent if relocated to a new location.152 Homeown-
ers with children struggle to find rental properties in the same
school district.153 And homeowners who must downsize struggle to
find a place to store their belongings.154 They may also face difficult
questions from family or acquaintances.155 In sum, the loss of a
home means a great deal more than just finding a new place to live.
It fundamentally alters a person’s entire life.
These problems produce real and lasting emotional and physical
harm.156 As one study concluded:
Repercussions may be felt in many areas, from parenting to
self-esteem, as turmoil, fear, and uncertainty rise. For some
families, increased personal and family stress feeds marital
problems and exacerbates negative behaviors (child abuse, ad-
dictions, etc.).157
Another study found that there were thirty-nine percent more sui-
cide attempts among those facing foreclosure than those who were
not.158 Another concluded that prolonged stress associated with
foreclosures increases a person’s chances of having hypertension
and heart disease and exacerbates pre-existing health conditions.159
There are two more emotional implications of foreclosure that
deserve specific attention and that are amplified in no-challenge
states. Professor Brent White160 analyzes why more homeowners do
not strategically default even when doing so would save them
http://www.foreclosure-response.org/policy_guide/why_foreclosures_matter






156. KINGSLEY, SMITH, & PRICE, supra note 149, at 12.
157. Id.
158. See Anna Cuevas, Foreclosure Related Suicide on the Rise, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16,
2012), http://.huffingtonpost.com//-suici_b_1678163.html; see also Janet Currie & Erdal
Tekin, Is There a Link Between Foreclosure and Health? 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17310, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17310.pdf (finding an in-
crease in hospitalizations for anxiety, suicide attempts, and hypertension in zip codes with
high rates of foreclosure).
159. Craig Evan Pollack & Julia Lynch, Health Status of People Undergoing Foreclosure in the
Philadelphia Region, 99 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1833, 1833–35 (2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2741520/pdf/1833.
160. Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 994 (2010).
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money.161 He concludes that a potent combination of guilt and
fear—guilt that one did not “honor their promises” and fear that
foreclosure will ruin their lives through wrecked credit—are at
work.162 He quotes homeowners who view the prospect of foreclo-
sure as “terrifying” and a young mother who described losing her
home as feeling like she “let [her] children down . . . a terrible
embarrassment, and [ ] humiliating.”163 White argues that these
feelings, even more than cognitive bias or innumeracy, may be the
explanation for the relatively small number of strategic defaults.
Put simply, people fight to stay in their homes, even when it does
not make financial sense, because they are afraid and worry that
they are being irresponsible, maybe even immoral, if they do not
fight to keep their home. White’s analysis suggests that wrongful
foreclosure followed by eviction will cause significant embarrass-
ment, deep humiliation, and paralyzing fear. This is also consistent
with research suggesting that individuals facing foreclosure exhibit
higher rates of major depression, and in some documented cases,
the threat of losing a home has led from depression to suicide.164
My own experiences counseling foreclosed homeowners square
with White’s conclusions. Homeowners routinely experience severe
depression after losing their homes. It is not uncommon for them
to reveal that they sought professional help, began taking medica-
tion for anxiety, or reverted to drinking after years of sobriety. Even
if homeowners lose their homes because of the bank’s failure to
accurately account for payments, those homeowners still describe
feeling shame at the “for sale” sign in the yard, having to answer
questions from family or friends, and from trying to explain the
problem to landlords who are frightened by a foreclosure on their
credit report.165
161. Id. at 979–86.
162. Id. at 1001, 1004.
163. Id. at 993.
164. Id.
165. Homeowners also routinely talked about things like the “dog is buried in the backy-
ard” or the pain of “saying goodbye to a neighborhood.” This suggests that both White’s
analysis, and the views of scholars like Radin—who suggested that home is a form of personal
property deeply entangled with identity—work together to create powerful attachments to
home. It is worth noting that the harms of wrongful foreclosure and actual eviction do not
stop with the homeowners. In addition to the disruption that accompanies family displace-
ment, even those who do not move can be affected, both mentally and physically. If cities are
forced to cut back on services—including emergency responders—because of the other costs
of foreclosures, such as a smaller budget as a result of a decreasing tax base, then residents
encounter challenges both to their safety and general wellbeing. In fact, if remaining re-
sidents seek to access basic services from their local governments, demand often exceeds the
supply of available community resources. Given that spillover effects linger after home fore-
closures, these impacts on municipalities and residents can set off a chain reaction that is
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For some, these problems are unavoidable; they are the conse-
quences of foreclosure. But for those who face wrongful
foreclosure, their residents in a challenge or no-challenge state de-
termines whether they will face the full array of potential emotional
and physical harm, or only a subset of those harms. And emotional
and physical harm to homeowners and their family are only the
beginning of damage caused by no-challenge regimes. The follow-
ing three Sections identify threats that extend beyond the
foreclosure system.
B. Claim Splitting
No-challenge states also run against the trend of eliminating
piecemeal litigation and encouraging resolution of all disputes in
one action. While the law has moved towards compulsory counter-
claims, joinder of parties, and, in general, promoting single-case
resolution issues for anything that arises from the “same transaction
or occurrence,” unlawful detainers produce splintered litigation.
This runs against the primary point of joinder rules: a desire to
make sure that “whenever feasible to settle all controversies be-
tween the litigants in one suit.”166 These rules are rooted in the idea
that broad joinder promotes judicial economy, and, as the primary
force behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains, “end[s]
the necessity for litigating the same issues over and over . . . .”167
At a functional level, no-challenge states take one transaction
and artificially divide it. Not only does this deviate from positive law,
but one can observe the implications of promoting, instead of dis-
couraging, piecemeal litigation. For example, no-challenge states
weaken confidence in the validity of foreclosure sales by leaving ul-
timate questions of title unresolved, even though the property may
then be resold multiple times. Because the unlawful detainer pro-
duces no res judicata effect, the homeowner still has the legal right
to challenge the foreclosure after the sale (sometimes as many as
five years later). This creates the possibility that multiple sales will
later be held invalid, creating cascading liability for subsequent buy-
ers and sellers. This is far from efficient and one of many reasons
likely to persist until the homes are reoccupied or adequate interim remedies are provided.
For a thorough discussion of the harms foreclosure causes communities, see David Kane,
Restoration Remedies for Remaining Residents, 61 UCLA L. REV. 812, 824 (2014).
166. See Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or Occurrence: Counterclaims, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 702–03 (2007).
167. Id. (citing Professor, later Judge, Charles E. Clark).
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piecemeal litigation is more costly, both in terms of time and
money, to litigants and to courts.
C. Suppressing Valid Claims
By definition, because no-challenge states choose to evict before
certainty that foreclosure is valid, they amplify the ultimate harm.
But the problem is worse than simply producing more wrongful
evictions. No-challenge states add insult to injury by making it less
likely that many evictions will ever be redressed. This happens in at
least two ways. First, homeowners are taught through experience in
no-challenge states that courts cannot help them. If a homeowner
tells a judge, and even proves to a judge that it is possible or even
likely that they are being evicted illegally, but that court proceeds
nonetheless with eviction, it erodes the homeowner’s confidence in
the judicial system. This delegitimizing is discussed more fully be-
low. Secondly, no-challenge states tend to suppress valid claims by
limiting the time and resources homeowners have to seek counsel
and making it less likely that the home will ever be returned—
thereby removing what is likely the primary reason to pursue the
claim at all.168 This is related to the claim splitting discussed supra.
Because the homeowner is forced to pursue remedies in a separate
action, it takes more time, money, and effort than simply raising
defenses. Ironically, although claim splitting would suggest more
cases (two for each issue), the result is that the second claim—an
affirmative claim by the homeowner—is typically suppressed.
In general, one would expect that nonjudicial states produce far
fewer homeowners who seek help or pursue claims to stop foreclo-
sure or eviction. And one would anticipate that no-challenge
regimes would suppress claims at a higher rate than challenge re-
gimes. But this effect, understandably, has not been measured in
other research. This is true for a number of reasons. In many states,
filing is not electronic, which makes it almost impossible to re-
search what claims are being filed in the state. And there are many
different types of claims that can be filed to challenge a foreclosure,
depending on what actions are alleged to have led to the illegal
foreclosure or attempted foreclosure.
These include, but are not limited to, wrongful foreclosure, neg-
ligence, negligent misrepresentation, common law fraud, breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, money had and received, tortious in-
terference with a contract, consumer fraud, and equitable claims
168. See infra Foreclosure Time Frames Tables.
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such as rescission. Because of the variety of claims, and because
those same claims can be pursued in a myriad of non-foreclosure
settings, even in states that have searchable electronic systems, iden-
tifying the number of claims that are filed cannot be accurately
measured without reviewing the individual factual allegations of
each potential complaint.
As a workaround, I attempted to identify other ways to roughly
approximate whether homeowners are seeking relief or pursuing
remedies related to foreclosures. One such effort is reflected in the
charts below. Drawing upon information from the National Fore-
closure Mitigation Counseling Program, I compiled the number of
foreclosures in each state as well as reports on the number of home-
owners who received assistance through a government program.169
This is not meant to suggest that homeowners could not have
sought relief in other ways. However, the working assumption is
that by observing all states, and by dividing each state into judicial
and nonjudicial categories, there may be some trends that suggest
whether nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings make it less likely that
homeowners will seek relief, and whether there is a similar trend
between challenge and no-challenge states. I have also included the
foreclosure timeframes for each state as a reference.
The charts tell a story consistent with my intuitions. Judicial states
accounted for 251,375 foreclosures in the studied time period, and
22,352 people received assistance. The nonjudicial states accounted
for 385,964 foreclosures, but only 20,754 people received assis-
tance. This means that despite accounting for over sixty percent of
all foreclosures, homeowners in nonjudicial foreclosure states ac-
counted for only forty-eight percent of those who received
assistance. Put another way, one out of 11.24 homeowners sought
assistance in judicial states, which is about 8.9%. In nonjudicial
states, the number falls to one out of 18.6 people, or 5.4%.
169. The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (“NFMC”) organizes,
trains, and funds over 1,200 nonprofit counseling agencies across the country. These organi-
zations provide free assistance to families at risk of losing their homes, determine
homeowner eligibility for state and federal foreclosure prevention assistance programs, and
identify possible courses of action. There is a much higher correlation of homeowners in
judicial states receiving assistance than in nonjudicial states. National Foreclosure Mitigation
Counseling Program Members, NEIGHBOR WORKS AMERICA, http://nfmcmembers.org/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 6, 2016).




STATE FORECLOSURES170 ASSISTANCE171 RATIO (%) (MONTHS)
Florida 111,005 3,871 3.5 9
New Mexico 2,620 162 6.2 7
South
Carolina 9,566 2,095 22.0 7
Illinois 31,054 824 2.7 13
Ohio 27,909 4,213 15.0 12
Pennsylvania 13,578 5,074 37.4 10
Louisiana 5,959 52 0.8 6
Maryland 4,474 2,128 48.0 6
New Jersey 3,996 193 4.8 14
New York 3,670 1,385 37.0 13
Indiana 17,510 160 0.9 12
Hawaii 492 310 63.0 9
Iowa 4,374 1 .0002 17
Kansas 3,690 125 3.4 12
New York 3,670 1,385 37.8 13
Massachusetts 2,971 176 5.9 8
Kentucky 2,121 179 8.4 7
Delaware 1,491 15 1.0 8
Maine 762 3 0.4 22
North Dakota 463 1 0.2 10
Total 251,375 22,352 8.9% 10.75
170. NATIONAL FORECLOSURE REPORT, CORELOGIC (2013), http://www.corelogic.com/
downloadable-docs/national-foreclosure-report-august-2013.pdf.
171. NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION COUNSELING PROGRAM: CONGRESSIONAL UPDATE,
NEIGHBORWORKS AMERICA (2013), http://www.neighborworks.org/Documents/Homeand
Finance_Docs/Foreclosure_Docs/ForeclosureCounseling(NFMC)_Docs/Congressional-
Repts/2013NFMCReport.aspx. This report did not provide data for Oklahoma or
Connecticut.




STATE FORECLOSURES ASSISTANCE RATIO (%) (MONTHS)
California 58,068 11,314 19.5 7
Arizona 25,911 936 3.6 4
North Carolina 26,577 1,179 4.4 5
Michigan 59,535 719 1.2 9
Texas 42,522 138 0.3 3
Georgia 39,827 2,111 5.3 4
Colorado 12,874 31 0.2 7
Missouri 14,147 734 5.2 3
Tennessee 19,876 489 2.5 4
Washington 19,839 27 0.1 6
Virginia 12,824 197 1.5 5
Nevada 10,229 1,025 10.0 7
Minnesota 11,071 770 7.0 12
Wisconsin 9,413 119 1.3 12
Alabama 6,857 753 11.0 4
Arkansas 5,228 5 .001 5
Idaho 3,906 88 2.3 9
Utah 3,698 3 .0008 5
Oregon 3,206 44 1.4 7
Nebraska172 1,723 4 0.2 6
New Hampshire 2,099 5 0.2 4
Rhode Island 1,592 3 0.2 3
Mississippi 1,169 14 1.2 4
Montana 1,122 37 3.3 9
Alaska 840 3 0.4 7
Wyoming 723 3 0.4 6
West Virginia 501 3 0.6 5
Total 385,964 20,754 5.4% 6
Further refining supports the intuition that although all nonjudi-
cial foreclosure states repress claims, no-challenge states do so at a
higher rate. As demonstrated in the charts below, challenge states
experienced 277,169 foreclosures in the studied timeframe. 17,018
172. Nebraska was categorized as a judicial state in the CoreLogic National Foreclosure
Report. CORELOGIC, supra note 170, at 7. However, Nebraska appears to have a mix of judicial
and nonjudicial foreclosures, and the trend is towards nonjudicial foreclosures. For that
reason, it is included here.
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sought assistance. That is 6.14% of all people experiencing foreclo-
sure. In no-challenge states, there were 99,132 foreclosures. Only
2,844 people received assistance, or 2.87%. This suggests that peo-
ple in challenge states seek assistance at a rate that is more than




STATE FORECLOSURES ASSISTANCE RATIO (%) (MONTHS)
Alabama 6,857 753 11.0 4
Arkansas 5,228 5 .001 5
Alaska 840 3 0.4 7
California 58,068 11,314 19.5 7
Colorado 12,874 31 0.2 7
Georgia 39,827 2,111 5.3 4
Idaho 3,906 88 2.3 9
Michigan 59,535 719 1.2 9
Mississippi 1,169 14 1.2 4
Montana 1,122 37 3.3 9
Nebraska 1,723 4 0.2 6
North Carolina 26,577 1,179 4.4 5
Oregon 3,206 44 1.4 7
South Dakota*
Tennessee 19,876 489 2.5 4
Utah 3,698 3 .008 5
Virginia 12,824 197 1.5 5
Washington 19,839 27 0.1 6
Total 277,169 17,018 6.14%




STATE FORECLOSURES ASSISTANCE RATIO (%) (MONTHS)
Arizona 25,911 936 3.6 4
Missouri 14,147 734 5.2 3
Nevada 10,229 1,025 10.0 7
New Hampshire 2,099 5 0.2 4
Texas 42,522 138 0.3 3
West Virginia 501 3 0.6 5
Wyoming 723 3 0.4 6
Total 99,132 2,844 2.87%
The primary suppressing agent in no-challenge states is likely re-
moval from the home. People who must find a new place to live and
experience life disruptions described in the preceding Part, before
they can even attempt to prove that the foreclosure is illegal, are
less likely to have the stamina to pursue a lawful claim. In addition
to having some reason to believe that the courts are stacked against
them, the homeowners are also occupied with the very real work of
surviving and are less likely to have the time or inclination to seek
legal counsel.
Finally, homeowners already thrown out of their homes have less
incentive to litigate. This may be the most fundamental way that no-
challenge states suppress claims. Most homeowners do not want
money when a foreclosure is wrongful; they want their house. They
want to stop the eviction and save the home where they raised their
kids, buried their dog, or celebrated their anniversaries. But if the
home is already sold and likely soon to be occupied by a new family,
there is far less reason to fight. Many homeowners, faced with the
stress of finding a new home and the reduced likelihood they will
ever recover their home, simply walk away. No-challenge states take
away the primary thing homeowners would fight for, and in doing
so they help immunize those who carry out wrongful foreclosure
claims. This claim suppression is compounded by the fact that evic-
tion produces lower wealth, and reduced wealth is tied to an
inability to access justice. “The costs of filing and maintaining a law-
suit may, for those with lower incomes and wealth, become
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insurmountable obstacles.”173 Socioeconomic status, and not the
strength of a claim, will exclude certain litigants.174
D. Broken Deterrence
The suppression of valid claims for wrongful foreclosure pro-
duces an unexpected, perverse result. Namely, wrongful
foreclosures lead to the suppression of claims that, if brought,
would have led to less wrongful foreclosures. Put another way, no-
challenge regimes eliminate economic disincentives that could pro-
duce market-based behavior reform. Although scholars debate the
overall effectiveness of the tort system as deterrent, there is strong
evidence that the ability to bring claims has a moderating effect on
undesirable and illegal behavior. For example, Gary Schwartz con-
cludes that tort law may not be the “strong” form of deterrence
some economic models would predict, but that it has at least a
“moderate” deterrent effect.175 Andrew Popper argues more force-
fully that suggesting that tort law has no deterrent effect is to “deny
our collective experience.”176 One of our country’s more learned
judges concurs. Richard Posner wrote in The Economic Structure of
Tort Law that “what empirical evidence there is indicates that tort
law likewise deters, even where . . . liability insurance is
widespread.”177
Studies of the actual decision makers at various companies sup-
port these conclusions. For example, when executives were asked
how they would respond to a tort lawsuit that resulted in liability for
a company in the same line of commerce, seventy-three percent
agreed that this would prompt their company “to examine methods
of production regarding the affected product [or service] and, if
needed, quietly take steps to make sure our products are in compli-
ance with applicable standards.”178 One might also conclude that
tort liability is a real concern given the efforts companies have
173. Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the Litigation
Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 618 (2012).
174. Id. at 620.
175. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 378–79 (1994).
176. Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 181 (2012).
177. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
10 (1987).
178. Popper, supra note 176, at 197.
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taken to insulate themselves from jury trials and class actions.179
Similarly, the number of companies that spend millions of dollars
on consulting from attorneys in order to avoid lawsuits, or the story
of the Ford Pinto, also suggest that tort claims can and do alter
behavior.180
If tort liability is at least a minimal deterrent of illegal behavior,
the claim suppression that occurs in no-challenge states is troub-
ling. Banks engage in wrongful foreclosures, and then a broken
legal regime allows that very foreclosure to produce injury that  in-
sulates the banks from claims that might otherwise result in liability
and behavior modification. This cycle misplaces economic incen-
tives at precisely the time in our history in which meaningful checks
on banks are necessary.181
E. Delegitimizing the Judicial System
No-challenge states weaken faith in the judicial system. The mort-
gage crisis that began in 2008 and continues today is one of the
most severe challenges the United States has faced. It is widely
agreed that reckless banks collapsed the world economy and then
carried out foreclosures that were often fundamentally flawed.182 It
is these same banks—and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—that are
the often buyers of foreclosed properties. When a state responds to
this crisis by enforcing laws that allow these banks to evict people
from their homes with no proof that the foreclosure is valid, it
raises significant questions about the rule of law and the legitimacy
of courts. Homeowners and those who observe their plight are left
wondering whether the law is rational and whether courts really
protect citizens and provide due process.
A cornerstone of American jurisprudence is that courts exist, and
more broadly that laws exist, to protect rights and to produce just
results. Indeed the preamble to the Constitution—our first legal
179. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (de-
tailing how major credit card companies include arbitration clauses to avoid juries and class
actions).
180. Liability, and punitive damages in particular, dissuade manufacturers from making
unsafe products. See e.g., Symposium, Jon S. Vernick et al., How Litigation Can Promote Product
Safety, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 551, 554 (Winter, 2004).
181. There has never been another time in United States history that resulted in more
scandals or complexity. For an overview of the problems in the modern mortgage era, see
John Campbell, Mortgage Crisis in a Nutshell, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2012), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=YBbwb6Sv4PM.
182. See, e.g., Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 7–8 (2009).
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document—identifies among its purposes establishing justice, pro-
moting the general welfare, and securing the blessing of liberty.183
Most of us assume that we are entitled to due process before we are
deprived of significant rights or property by the government. And it
is widely believed—if not always fervently so—that courts exist to
produce just results and to resolve disputes.
The belief that courts must be perceived as providing fair process
and that courts must, at least in general, produce results that con-
form to notions of justice is rooted in rich bodies of literature. For
example, in the criminal law context,
[a] growing literature suggests that a criminal justice system
derives practical value by generating societal perceptions of
fair enforcement and adjudication. Specifically, perceptions of
procedural fairness—resulting in perceptions of the system’s
‘legitimacy,’ as the term is used—may promote systemic com-
pliance with substantive law, cooperation with legal institutions
and actors, and deference to even unfavorable outcomes.184
Research suggests that when a criminal justice system is perceived as
doling out liability and punishment in ways that map nicely onto
societal institutions of justice, it promotes compliance, cooperation,
and deference.185
These twin pillars of “legitimacy” and “moral credibility” are both
important to public faith in courts. However, of the two, process
looms larger.186 And this is more than mere instrumentalism.187 Re-
search suggests that people do not value process merely because it
will produce fair results.188 Instead, the best explanation may be
from Kees Van den Boss, whose “fairness heuristic theory” suggests
183. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
184. Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims
and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 211–12
(2012).
185. Id. at 211–12, 211 n. 3. (referring to work by numerous scholars, including LAURA I.
APPLEMAN, SENTENCING, EMPIRICAL DESERT, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, IN CRIMINAL LAW CON-
VERSATIONS 59 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds. 2009), PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 135–212, 231–60
(2008); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American “Revolution in Punishment The-
ory,” 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113 (2010)).
186. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–7 (1990).
187. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law:
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6–7 (2011).
188. Id.
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why procedure is vital to perceptions of fairness.189 In essence, Van
den Boss asserts that people will not always know whether outcomes
are just (in contrast to the view of equity theorists).190 This is be-
cause they may not have other outcomes to compare the results to.
But what they will frequently have is information about the pro-
cess.191 Through substitution, or perhaps because of the availability
heuristic, they will judge the outcome by asking, “Was the process
fair?” If it was, they will accept the outcome more readily, and deem
the entire process just.
Indeed, Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler say:
Procedural justice research suggests not only that people are
more satisfied with the results of a fair decision making pro-
cess, but also that people are more likely to defer to the
decisions and judgments of an authority, and comply with
those judgments in the long term, when they perceive that the
authority has made those decisions according to a fair
process.192
Even perceptions of whether the decision maker acted neutrally
may be bound up with whether the decision maker was perceived to
follow fair procedures.193 And this perception of whether proce-
dures are fair, at least in terms of judicial proceedings, turns
partially on whether it appears that the decision maker based her
decision on facts and evidence.194 As Hollander-Blumhoff and Tyler
explain, “[b]ecause the legal system in the United States is adver-
sarial and relies on parties to present their own evidence, this in
turn links voice and an opportunity to be heard with principles of
rule of law.”195
One of the most prolific and respected authors on procedural
justice theories, Nancy Welsh, distilled what research reveals about
what leads people to conclude that a dispute resolution process is
procedurally fair.196 There are four factors: (1) “the process pro-
vides an opportunity for the disputants to express their views
189. Kees van den Bos, Fairness Heuristic Theory: Assessing the Information to Which People Are
Reacting has a Pivotal Role in Understanding Organizational Justice, in THEORETICAL & CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 63–80 (2001).
190. Id. at 65.
191. Id.
192. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 187, at 6.
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 10.
195. Id.
196. Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and
Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52 (2004).
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(generally described as ‘an opportunity for voice’);” (2) “the third
party demonstrates consideration towards what the disputants have
said;” (3) “the third party treats the disputants in an even-handed
way and tries to be fair;” and (4) “the third party treats the dispu-
tants with dignity and respect.”197
If it is true that procedural fairness is essential to overall percep-
tions about the fairness of dispute resolution, then it does not take
much analysis to see how unlawful detainers degrade perceptions of
legitimacy in courts. Welsh’s factors allow for a clear analysis: (1)
the unlawful detainer process in no-challenge states denies any “op-
portunity for voice”; (2) it prohibits the judge from considering any
evidence produced by the homeowner/defendant; (3) it advan-
tages the plaintiff by removing its burden of proof; and (4)
although the court may not intend or desire to treat the homeown-
ers with anything less than respect, the process itself—as discussed
supra—causes homeowners humiliation, fear, and general emo-
tional harm. Beyond degrading the homeowner’s confidence in the
courts, the systemic problems in the unlawful detainer law—at least
in no-challenge states—will also serve to erode public confidence in
courts. This is never desirable, but it is even more problematic
given the abysmal view the American public has developed for the
judiciary.198
V. THE WAY FORWARD
  Based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude that no-challenge re-
gimes are both analytically inexplicable and morally indefensible.
But if one accepts this, what solutions are there? The promise lies in
challenge states.
Challenge states strike a balance between speed and legitimacy;
they marry the best features of nonjudicial foreclosure with the best
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective
on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 872 (1997) (“Recent public opinion polls
provide evidence that dissatisfaction with the legal system is widespread and that the public
generally holds lawyers and judges in low regard.”). Things have not improved since 1997.
Tyler reported that only thirty to forty percent of Americans reported having “a great deal of
confidence in the Supreme Court as an institution.” A recent Gallup Poll reported only
twelve percent had a “great deal” of confidence, while only eighteen percent more had “quite
a lot.” Similarly, only ten percent had a great deal of confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem, with only thirteen percent reporting “quite a lot” of confidence in the same. Confidence
in Institutions, GALLUP (June 5–8, 2014) http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx.
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features of judicial foreclosure. In challenge states, initially, all fore-
closures move quickly because they are nonjudicial. However, if a
foreclosure is at least arguably improper, that matter can be raised
by the homeowner in the unlawful detainer. Since these issues can
be litigated in the unlawful detainer, and since most homeowners
who face eviction but believe that it is unjust will at least raise the
issues, the foreclosures that need examination receive it. This
means less homeowners lose their homes inappropriately, but it
also means that many times foreclosures occur with minimal court
involvement. As a result, no-challenge states should be converted to
challenge states. The primary methods for accomplishing this must
be statutory reform and constitutional challenges. The remaining
Sections briefly discuss both options, noting limitations to my analy-
sis and realistic obstacles to reform.
A. Constitutional Challenges
Many lawyers with whom I have discussed this topic assert that
the no-challenge regime cannot be constitutional. They mention
problems with procedural due process, noting that this seems to be
a clear example of the right to a pre-deprivation hearing. I readily
agree; however, as tempting as these arguments may sound, I then
note that constitutional challenges have already failed in some
states.199
I have personal experience with this. I was part of an impact liti-
gation claim200 designed to challenge the unlawful detainer statute
in Missouri.201 Missouri was ripe for such a claim because it has a
rare combination of especially swift nonjudicial foreclosure and
particularly harsh unlawful detainers statutes. The nonjudicial fore-
closures occur in about three weeks—the fastest in the country.
This meant temporary restraining orders were almost never ob-
tained prior to the sale, and homeowners struggled to understand
the foreclosure process before their home was sold.
Compounding the problem, the unlawful detainer laws in Mis-
souri are uniquely restrictive. Missouri has an outright ban on
inquiry into title. The statute states: “The merits of the title shall in
199. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 457–58 (Mo. 2013).
200. While working at Simon Law PC, Erich Vieth and I filed a number of impact litiga-
tion claims. We partnered on this claim with Campbell Law LLC, founded by Alicia
Campbell, my wife.
201. Id.
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nowise be inquired into . . . .”202 The state also prohibits counter-
claims and affirmative defenses via common law.
But perhaps the most draconian portion of the unlawful detainer
law is the double damage provision. The law provides that if a per-
son is found to be unlawfully detaining a property, she must pay
twice the fair monthly rent.203 This adds insult to injury, and makes
it even less likely that a homeowner will try to slow an unlawful de-
tainer. Indeed, if a homeowner wanted to file a separate action to
stay the unlawful detainer, his attorney would almost certainly coun-
sel him one of the risk of double damages accruing throughout the
litigation. Similarly, the author is aware of some courts that have
standing orders that unlawful detainers may not be stayed.
These characteristics meant that in Missouri, a homeowner could
face a wrongful foreclosure, then face an unlawful detainer in
which there was no right to present evidence regarding the illegal-
ity of the foreclosure, only to then be ordered to pay extraordinary
amounts of money to the party that purchased the home. After con-
sulting with colleagues, our team of attorneys concluded that
evicting homeowners in a court action that did not allow them to
defend the claim at all violated due process. We pursued a direct
appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, challenging the validity of
the statute.204 Our facts were good. The homeowner had substantial
proof that the foreclosure was illegal and void.205 We advanced both
due process and equal protection arguments. Namely, we argued
that it violated fundamental procedural due process requirements
to create a court proceeding in which the plaintiff was guaranteed
to win, even if it presented no evidence, and the defendant was
guaranteed to lose, precisely because it had no right to defend. We
argued that there could be no justification for creating an irrebut-
table presumption in favor of one party, and that this was especially
true given that what was at stake was a home (sacred under the
law). We also advanced an equal protection argument, asserting
that there was no rational basis for allowing one particular set of
plaintiffs to win every single case filed without evidence, when every
plaintiff in every other case had to offer proof.206
We lost.
202. MO. REV. STAT. § 534.210 (2014).
203. MO. REV. STAT. § 534.330 (2014).
204. Like many states, the Missouri Constitution grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
the state’s supreme court to hear challenges to the validity of statutes. MO. CONST. art. V, § 3.
205. For a detailed factual account, see Brief for Appellants, Wells Fargo Bank, 392 S.W.3d
446 (Mo. 2013) (No. SC92649), 2012 WL 6825485.
206. Id.
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The court held that unlawful detainer law was ancient and well
established, citing law dating back to at least King Henry II circa
1166.207 It concluded that although it may not be ideal to split the
causes of action, a homeowner could avoid losing his home by filing
a separate action in another court.208 And even if the homeowner
lost his home before filing that action, his rights were preserved
because he could pursue a separate action.209 The court suggested
that the legislature might want to look at the issue, but held it could
not wade into these “policy” arguments.210 It cited to Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)—from the rental context—for addi-
tional support.211
I must admit that I am not entirely persuaded by the court’s rea-
soning, but the point of this Article is not to re-litigate the case.
Rather, I document the failure of this impact litigation (a somewhat
hard thing to relive) to highlight the fact that constitutional chal-
lenges in no-challenge states are far from guaranteed to succeed.
Despite success in the Missouri Supreme Court in the past on con-
sumer issues, despite a solid set of facts, and despite advancing legal
and equitable arguments, we lost. It is entirely possible that chal-
lenges in other states would face similar results. Unlawful detainer
procedures are deeply engrained, and although some no-challenge
courts have not considered a direct challenge to constitutionality,
they have nonetheless, consistently, if only implicitly, approved the
unlawful detainer procedures.212
However, none of this is meant to say that others are guaranteed
to fail. Impact litigation brought by established constitutional schol-
ars and litigators could improve on our arguments raised in Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith,213 and strong expert work in a trial court
might lend additional factual support to the case. Courts are be-
coming increasingly educated about mortgage issues, and they may
be more responsive to these arguments. Finally, it is my hope that
207. Wells Fargo Bank, 392 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Mo. 2013).
208. Indeed, the court went so far as to chastise the plaintiff (or us) for not doing so. See
id. at 463. In doing so, the court ignored the law that prevented the unlawful detainer court
from staying its own action.
209. See id. at 459.
210. Id. at 464.
211. Id. at 457–58.
212. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court has had multiple opportunities to con-
sider the forcible entry and detainer statutes. It has never expressed any concerns about the
due process implications in its holdings. See, e.g., Curtis v. Morris, 925 P.2d 259, 260 (Ariz.
1996); Taylor v. Stanford, 414 P.2d 727, 730 (Ariz. 1966); Hinton v. Hotchkiss, 174 P.2d 749,
754 (Ariz. 1946).
213. 392 S.W.3d at 449.
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this Article provides at least some additional arguments and empiri-
cal evidence to support challenges—information that we could not
fully gather in the Missouri case. Regardless, at a minimum, consti-
tutional litigation takes time and the result is not certain. Another
potential avenue for reform lies in the legislature. I discuss some
specific tenets of reform below.
B. Statutory Reform
If impact litigation is not an option, the only other clear path is
statutory reform. This can be accomplished by the normal legisla-
tive means, or in the right states, by ballot initiative. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to craft legislation, but I suggest a few central
tenets that should be included.
1. The proposed statutory language should explicitly apply only
to foreclosures of residential properties that are primary
dwellings.
2. The proposed statutory language should not attempt to red-
line unlawful detainer law. This will create unnecessary
complications. Instead, I would suggest new statutory lan-
guage that relates only to residential properties and that
prescribes an exclusive means of eviction.
3. The proposed statutory language should explicitly allow for
sanctions against homeowners who assert frivolous defenses,
including potential sanctions and a doubling or trebling of
rent owed.
4. The proposed statutory language should require the new
buyer to prove title, prove the homeowner possesses the
property, and to prove damages.
5. The proposed statutory language should explicitly state that
if the homeowner challenges title, the action will be con-
verted into a quiet title action in which the court is required
to resolve who ultimately owns the property.
6. The proposed statutory language should state that these resi-
dential eviction actions can be pursued in any appropriate
court, including associate courts, but that a homeowner may
move to transfer the case to a circuit or district court if he
contests title. The language should indicate that such mo-
tions shall be granted.
7. The proposed statutory language should overtly allow for
counterclaims and affirmative defenses.
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C. A Compromise Solution
In some states, both impact litigation and legislative reform may
be destined to fail. In those states, local courts could marginally
improve the situation by enacting local rules. Those rules would say
that if a homeowner files an affirmative action that calls into ques-
tion the validity of title while an unlawful detainer proceeding is
ongoing, the unlawful detainer proceeding shall be stayed. This
does not avoid piecemeal litigation and may encourage forum
shopping, but it does avoid wrongful evictions prior to adjudica-
tion. This reform may seem simple, however, it is my experience
that some states do not allow courts that hear unlawful detainers to
stay their own actions. Based on the “summary proceeding” lan-
guage, courts are sometimes compelled to move forward, even if
the court has concerns about doing so. A local rule by the chief
judge could potentially alleviate this tension, so long as there is no
case precedent in conflict with the rule.
D. Potential Critiques of This Conclusion and Responses
Some may argue that if a homeowner can delay eviction by argu-
ing the foreclosure was illegal, this will create frivolous assertions of
that kind so that the homeowner can obtain more time in the
home. This concern is unlikely to prove true. In all cases, a defen-
dant can raise frivolous defenses, engage in motion practice, refuse
to produce discovery, invent reasons to push the trial setting, and
otherwise delay having to pay a judgment. This is dealt with
through ethical rules that prohibit lawyers from pursuing non-meri-
torious defenses and by courts who have the power to dismiss such
defenses or otherwise refuse delays. In the unlawful detainer set-
ting, there is also a guarantee that a homeowner who delays can be
ordered to pay rent for the time they were in the home.214 Although
this does not mean there will never be a frivolous defense, it does
mean that the risk is no greater than it is in other cases.
Others may argue that allowing challenges will create de facto
judicial foreclosure because courts will have to wade through the
bona fides of each foreclosure. Two things are clear. First, half of all
states have judicial foreclosure, and their economies continue to
function. Full judicial foreclosure does not damn a state to eco-
nomic ruin. Second, only contested unlawful detainers will end up
214. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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being litigated, as only homeowners with concerns about the under-
lying foreclosure will assert them. As a result, only a small fraction
of the total foreclosures in a state will be considered by the court.
Finally, some will argue that sorting out foreclosures will slow
down evictions. At a normative level, society should, and routinely
does, value fairness over expediency, even if doing so has costs.
Moreover, current no-challenge regimes deviate from trends in
American law, making them the anomaly that should be rectified.
Finally, any assertion that expedited eviction is good for the econ-
omy is undercut by countervailing arguments that such expediency
perverts the economic deterrent impact of torts and delegitimizes
courts—two outcomes that are destabilizing to society and that can
actually reduce voluntary compliance with courts.
CONCLUSION
No-challenge states are broken, but there is no need to invent a
solution. Instead, we know that it is possible to recognize the effi-
ciencies of nonjudicial foreclosure while obtaining the accuracy of
judicial review. Challenge states provide this working model and re-
present the majority position. No-challenge states should adopt this
model too. Doing so offers significant gains to homeowners, courts,
and society as a whole, and it produces surprisingly little cost to
stakeholders. Indeed, while maintaining efficiency, it repairs a
number of existing problems by reducing unnecessary injury to
homeowners, aligning unlawful detainer law with notions of joinder
and home-centric jurisprudence, protecting process and judicial le-
gitimacy, and promoting, rather than suppressing, tort claims that
are needed to produce market reform.
